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1 
REFUTING THE RIGHT  
NOT TO KNOW 
BENJAMIN E. BERKMAN* 
While promising to eventually revolutionize medicine, the capacity to 
cheaply and quickly generate an individual’s entire genome has not been 
without controversy. Producing information on this scale seems to violate 
some of the accepted norms governing the practice of medicine, norms that 
evolved during the early years of genetic testing when a targeted paradigm 
dominated. One of these widely accepted norms was that an individual had 
a right not to know genetic information about him or herself. Prompted by 
evolving professional practice guidelines, the right not to know has become 
a highly controversial topic. The medical community and bioethicists are 
actively engaged in a contentious debate about the extent to which 
individual choice should play a role (if at all) in determining which 
clinically significant findings are returned.  
This paper explores the extent to which it is legally and ethically 
necessary to respect the so-called right not to know genetic information 
about oneself. Challenging the majority view that the right not to know is 
sacrosanct, I push back against that vigorously held (although not always 
rigorously defended) position, in defense of the idea that we should 
abandon the notion of a strong right not to know. Drawing on the fields of 
law, philosophy and social science, I provide an extended argument in 
support of a default for returning high value genetic information without 
asking about a preference not to know. I conclude by offering some 
recommendations about how best to balance individual autonomy and 
professional beneficence as the field of genomic medicine continues to 
evolve. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The past decade has seen almost unimaginable advances in genomic 
sequencing capabilities.1 In the field’s early days, generation of sequence 
data was the primary bottleneck; it took more than a decade and billions of 
dollars to produce the first full map of the human genome.2 In the years 
since the Human Genome Project was completed, however, the cost and 
efficiency of sequencing technology has improved dramatically.3 Massively 
parallel sequencing platforms began appearing in 2005, and as this new 
technology continued to evolve, the previously unimaginable goal of a 
$1000 genome is now nearly obtainable.4 As a result, genomic sequencing 
has become a powerful tool for researchers5 and is emerging as an 
important component of clinical medicine.6 
While promising to eventually revolutionize medicine,7 the capacity to 
cheaply and quickly generate an individual’s entire genome has not been 
 
 1. See Elaine R. Mardis, A Decade’s Perspective on DNA Sequencing Technology, 470 
NATURE 198, 198 (2011) (discussing the advancements in sequencing technology from 2001 to 
2011 and analyzing the impacts of these advancements in various fields). 
 2. Francis S. Collins et al., The Human Genome Project: Lessons from Large-Scale Biology, 
300 SCIENCE 286, 286–89 (2003) (detailing the timeline and cost of sequencing the first human 
genome). 
 3. Mardis, supra note 1, at 198–99, 201. 
 4. See Kris Wetterstrand, DNA Sequencing Costs: Data from the NHGRI Genome 
Sequencing Program (GSP) – Cost Per Genome, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (Oct. 2, 2015), 
http://www.genome.gov/sequencingcosts (including a graph showing the decreasing cost of 
genome sequencing since 2001); see also Francis S. Collins & Margaret A. Hamburg, First FDA 
Authorization for Next-Generation Sequencer, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2369, 2369 (2013) (“[A] 
human genome can be sequenced in about 24 hours for . . . less than $5,000.”); see also W. 
Gregory Feero et al., Genomic Medicine — An Updated Primer, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2001, 
2008, 2010 (2010) (discussing advances in technology that are driving down the costs of genome 
sequencing). 
 5. See Jamie K. Teer & James C. Mullikin, Exome Sequencing: The Sweet Spot Before 
Whole Genomes, 19 HUM. MOLECULAR GENETICS R145, R147 (2010) (explaining the wide range 
of purposes for which genomic sequencing can be used, from “disease causation and diagnosis to 
evolutionary comparison of ancient genomes”). 
 6. See Francis S. Collins, Medical and Societal Consequences of the Human Genome 
Project, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 28, 29–31, 33–34, 36 (1999) (discussing potential clinical 
applications of human genomic sequencing); see also Teri A. Manolio et al., Implementing 
Genomic Medicine in the Clinic: The Future is Here, 15 GENETICS MED. 258, 258, 266 (2013) 
(noting that many medical institutions have implemented genomic information into their clinical 
care); Katherine Johansen Taber et al., The Promise and Challenges of Next-Generation Genome 
Sequencing for Clinical Care, 174 JAMA INTERN. MED. 275, 275–79 (2014) (discussing 
examples of how human genomic sequencing information can be applied in a clinical setting). 
 7. See, e.g., Eric D. Green et al., Charting a Course for Genomic Medicine From Base Pairs 
to Bedside, 470 NATURE 204, 204, 205, 207, 209, 211 (2011) (explaining the current and future 
impact of genomics on medicine); Editorial, Human Genome at Ten, 464 NATURE 649, 649 
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without controversy.8 The problematic characteristic of large-scale genomic 
sequencing is the thing that makes it such a powerful tool: the ability to 
quickly and cheaply produce massive amounts of genomic information 
about an individual. Producing information on this scale seems to violate 
some of the accepted norms governing how to practice medicine— norms 
that evolved during the early years of genetic testing when a targeted 
paradigm dominated. Traditionally, doctors would only order a targeted test 
designed to elucidate specific information about a particular medical 
problem.9 Similarly, researchers generally only collected the targeted data 
necessary to answer their well-defined scientific questions.10 Genetic 
counselors focused on conveying the risks and benefits associated with the 
testing of a single gene or genes, with the goal of learning more about one 
highly penetrant disease.11 
Genomic sequencing, in contrast, is not targeted and produces massive 
amounts of extraneous information, some of which can have relevance for 
an individual’s health.12 This mismatch between the specific indication that 
led to ordering the test and the breadth of results that the test produces has 
ignited an ongoing debate about the ethics of managing what have become 
known as incidental or secondary findings.13 Incidental or secondary 
 
(2010) (mentioning a White House press statement discussing the remarkable scientific advances 
and clinical applications that will be afforded by human genome sequencing). 
 8. See Holly K. Tabor et al., Genomics Really Gets Personal: How Exome and Whole 
Genome Sequencing Challenge the Ethical Framework of Human Genetics Research, 155 AM. J. 
MED. GENETICS 2916, 2917 (2011) (discussing how genome sequencing has created controversy 
by altering the standard ethical framework of researchers); see also Amy L. McGuire et al., 
Research Ethics and the Challenge of Whole-Genome Sequencing, 9 NAT. REV. GENETICS 152, 
152, 155 (2008) (discussing ethical controversies created by cost-efficient genome sequencing 
technologies).  
 9. See Isaac S. Kohane et al., The Incidentalome: A Threat to Genomic Medicine, 296 JAMA 
212, 212 (2006) (noting that, generally, doctors order tests for specific purposes only if “such tests 
will result in a change in [patient] management”). 
 10. See Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: 
Analysis and Recommendations, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 219, 219 (2008) (defining “incidental 
findings” and explaining that because such findings are only discovered during the course of 
conducting research, they are usually outside the scope of the initial research protocol); see also 
Erik Parens et al., Incidental Findings in the Era of Whole Genome Sequencing?, 43 HASTINGS 
CTR. REP. 16, 18 (2013) (explaining that in conducting a search for pathologic variants, genomic 
researchers “restrict their analyses to . . . the focus of their study”). 
 11. Parens, supra note 10, at 16. 
 12. See Wylie Burke et al., Seeking Genomic Knowledge: The Case for Clinical Restraint, 64 
HASTINGS L.J. 1649, 1650 (2013) (discussing how genomic tests “generate unprecedented 
amounts of information, much of it extraneous”); see also Wolf et al., supra note 10, at 226 
(noting that “approximately 10% of [incidental findings] have . . . potential medical significance 
needing further clinical response.”). 
 13. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, ANTICIPATE AND 
COMMUNICATE: ETHICAL MANAGEMENT OF INCIDENTAL AND SECONDARY FINDINGS IN THE 
CLINICAL, RESEARCH, AND DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER CONTEXTS 22, 27–28 (Dec. 2013) [hereinafter 
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findings are pieces of information (often clinically significant and medically 
actionable) that arise from a test or procedure but that are beyond the 
original purpose for which the test or procedure was conducted.14 The 
problem of incidental or secondary findings has been a major source of 
contention in the research ethics and science policy realms for the past 
decade.15  
Much of this vigorous debate has centered on defining the contours of 
the obligation towards patients and research participants whose genomes 
are being sequenced. For example, given that researchers and clinicians 
have different obligations to participants and patients,16 to what extent is it 
required that researchers devote time and resources towards the return of 
clinical information unrelated to their scientific aims?17 Is there a duty to 
actively interrogate sequencing data to look for incidental findings as the 
difficulty of doing so decreases?18 Does an obligation to disclose clinically 
relevant information extend to relatives of participants or patients, 
particularly after the death of the proband?19 Is there any risk of liability for 
failure to disclose clinically relevant incidental findings?20 
 
PCSBI, ANTICIPATE AND COMMUNICATE], http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/ 
FINALAnticipateCommunicate_PCSBI_0.pdf. The President’s Commission for the Study of 
Bioethical Issues draws a useful terminological distinction between incidental and secondary 
findings. Incidental findings represent a broad category of information unrelated to the aim of the 
test or research. They can be anticipatable (“Practitioner aims to discover A, but learns B, a result 
known to be associated with the test or procedure at the time it takes place”) or unanticipatable 
(“Practitioner aims to discover A, but learns C, a result not known to be associated with the test or 
procedure at the time it takes place”). In contrast, secondary findings represent the narrow 
category of unrelated findings that are actively sought (“Practitioner aims to discover A, and also 
actively seeks D per expert recommendation”). 
 14. Wolf et al., supra note 10, at 226. I have adapted my definition from Wolf’s commonly 
cited definition of incidental finding: “[A] finding concerning an individual research participant 
that has potential health or reproductive importance and is discovered in the course of conducting 
research but is beyond the aims of the study.” Wolf’s definition is simultaneously too narrow 
(only applying to the research setting) and too broad (accepting an expansive view of what 
constitutes an important finding). 
 15. Leigh Jackson et al., Incidental Findings in Genetic Research and Clinical Diagnostic 
Tests: A Systematic Review, 158A AM. J. MED. GENETICS 3159, 3160, 3166 (2012). 
 16. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAV. 
RES., THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTION OF 
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, 1, 2–3 (1978).  
 17. Gail P. Jarvik et al., Return of Genomic Results to Research Participants: The Floor, the 
Ceiling, and the Choices In Between, 94 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 818, 818–19, 823 (2014). 
 18. Catherine Gliwa & Benjamin E. Berkman, Do Researchers Have an Obligation to 
Actively Look for Genetic Incidental Findings?, 13 AM. J. BIOETHICS 32 (2013). 
 19. See Ben Chan et al., Genomic Inheritances: Disclosing Individual Research Results From 
Whole-Exome Sequencing to Deceased Participants’ Relatives, 12 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1, 1, 6 
(2012) (concluding that limited relevant information should be passively disclosed to relatives 
unless it is unduly burdensome to the research team). 
 20. See Elizabeth R. Pike et al., Finding Fault?: Exploring Legal Duties to Return Incidental 
Findings in Genomic Research, 102 GEO. L.J. 795, 798–99, 815, 843 (2014) (advocating for a 
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While these are all important questions, I wish to bracket them in order 
to explore a different and increasingly controversial issue: the extent to 
which it is legally and ethically necessary to respect the so-called right not 
to know (“RNTK”) genetic information about oneself. As the field of 
genetic medicine has emerged over the past few decades, the RNTK has 
been a persistent and widely accepted bioethical tenet.21 Simply put, it 
involves the idea that an individual should be able to control the genetic 
information about themselves to which they are exposed.22 The idea came 
to particular prominence in the early research protocols that were looking 
for genetic variants predictive of breast cancer.23 In a world where breast 
cancer was still fairly stigmatizing, and treatment options were much less 
successful, it was certainly understandable why women might want to be 
given the opportunity to make a reasoned decision about whether or not to 
receive this information.24 Similar arguments were often made about other 
devastating conditions, such as Huntington’s disease and Alzheimer’s 
disease.25 
In a rapidly moving field like medical genetics, the standard of care 
will often naturally be in a state of flux. As sequencing capacity has 
exploded, and as the breadth and depth of predictive genetic knowledge has 
grown, questions about the ongoing appropriateness of a strong RNTK have 
emerged. Medical genetics providers and bioethicists have been engaged in 
a contentious debate about the extent to which individual choice should 
play a role in determining which clinically significant findings are returned. 
Autonomy is a core principle of clinical ethics, but the rapid expansion of 
sequencing power is challenging conventional wisdom in uncomfortable 
ways and is forcing a reexamination of what an appropriate standard of care 
looks like in a genomic era. Are traditional conceptions about non-directive 
counseling still appropriate? Are there any circumstances where it might be 
ethically appropriate to override an individual’s expressed wish not to know 
 
policy requiring researchers to explicitly disclose which of three ethically acceptable approaches 
they will employ). 
 21. See discussion infra Part II. 
 22. See Kirke D. Weaver, Genetic Screening and the Right Not To Know, 13 ISSUES L. & 
MED. 243, 270 (1997) (defining the RNTK as “the individual decision whether or not to undergo 
genetic screening or monitoring”). 
 23. See discussion infra Part II.B.4. 
 24. See, e.g., Litanja Lodder et al., Psychological Impact of Receiving a BRCA1/BRCA2 Test 
Result, 98 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 15 (2001) (assessing psychological distress in women at risk of 
hereditary breast cancer). 
 25. See, e.g., Ruth Chadwick et al., The Right to Know and the Right Not to Know: The 
Emerging Debate, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW AND THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW: GENETIC PRIVACY 
AND RESPONSIBILITY 18 (Ruth Chadwick et al. eds., 2014) (discussing a British woman who 
refused predictive testing for Alzheimer’s disease so she could retain hope for the future). 
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genetic information about him or herself? How, if at all, should the RNTK 
be reflected in informed consent and return of results policies? 
To make these questions more concrete, imagine the following 
scenario: P is having her genome sequenced as part of a diagnostic work-up 
for what is suspected to be a rare genetic disorder. During the informed 
consent process, she clearly checks the box opting not to receive any 
incidental genetic results. While analyzing P’s genomic data, her physicians 
happen to find evidence of high genetic risk for Hereditary Non-Polyposis 
Colon Cancer (“HNPCC”). HNPCC is treatable if found early, but is nearly 
always fatal if discovered in its late stages. They believe that this 
information will prevent serious disease and perhaps even save P’s life 
because it would direct her to seek enhanced screening for a cancer that is 
very difficult to pick up with normal colonoscopies. Should they disclose 
the finding, even though P indicated that she did not want to receive any 
secondary findings? 
Instincts about whether or not to honor P’s RNTK vary widely, 
pointing to the contentiousness of this debate.26 The emerging controversy 
about the RNTK highlights two of the classic problems in bioethics. First, it 
focuses us on the frequent tension between autonomy and beneficence.27 
We place an extremely high value on empowering and honoring an 
individual’s choices, particularly in the medical realm.28 On the other hand, 
cases like the one outlined above present a clear dilemma for physicians 
who want to act in a way that provides the highest prospect of benefit for 
their patients. When someone chooses not to know beneficial information 
about him or herself, it forces doctors to address an extremely difficult 
decision: not honoring a clearly stated choice, or forgoing the opportunity 
to take advantage of potentially beneficial medical information. 
The RNTK also highlights a second commonly observed problem in 
the field of bioethics: the difficulty with rights language. Rights are 
generally seen as having “special normative force”29 with the power to 
trump other interests.30 But the use of rights language can be criticized 
 
 26. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 27. See, e.g., David E. Ost, The “Right” Not to Know, 9 J. MED. PHIL. 301, 303–04, 310 
(1984) (“The question of refusal of information is an important one in medical ethics because it 
brings into direct confrontation two value orientations which are often conflated in ordinary 
experience: the humane and the humanistic.”). 
 28. See id. at 301, 303 (advocating for a right to refuse important medical information). See 
also Roberto Andorno, The Right Not to Know: An Autonomy Based Approach, 30 J. MED. 
ETHICS 435, 435–37 (2004) (interpreting the right to not know the results of genetic tests as part 
of a patient’s freedom to make choices regarding medical decisions). 
 29. Leif Wenar, Rights, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 5.1 (Edward N. 
Zalta ed., 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/rights/. 
 30. See Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153 (Jeremy Waldron 
ed., 1984). 
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because rights are inherently absolute, effectively “inhibit[ing] dialogue that 
might lead toward consensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of 
common ground.”31 This has the effect of enabling people to pre-emptively 
short-circuit discussion, thereby avoiding the necessity of making actual 
arguments, and often resulting in a move “toward confrontation instead of 
negotiation, as each side escalates an arms race of rights assertions that can 
only be resolved by a superior authority like a court.”32 
As genomic sequencing technology continues to drive a re-
examination of ethical norms and standards of care, there needs to be 
serious deliberation about the appropriateness of the RNTK in a genomic 
era, given the obvious and inevitable conflict between autonomy and 
beneficence that such a right creates. Because the ability to control what 
genetic information is revealed has been imbued with the power of a right, 
the debate thus far has been unduly focused on the seemingly absolute 
nature of an individual’s autonomy.33 The majority view seems to be that 
the RNTK continues to be of paramount importance and should not be 
abrogated in any way. 
A case can be made, however, that genomic medicine is holding too 
tightly to an outdated conception of the RNTK. My goal in this article is to 
push back against that vigorously held (although not always rigorously 
defended) position in defense of the idea that we should abandon the notion 
of a strong RNTK. I will provide an extended argument in support of a 
default for returning high value genetic information without asking about a 
preference not to know. To be clear, I do not intend to argue that there is no 
role for patient preferences in determining the kind of genetic information 
to be disclosed. Rather, I will be focusing only on the extent to which there 
is a RNTK genetic information associated with conditions where medical 
action can mitigate or prevent mortality or serious morbidity, and where 
there is strong evidence of the link between genotype and significant 
disease risk.  
In Part II, I will describe the apparent early consensus around the 
RNTK, and the subsequent controversy that erupted upon publication of the 
American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics Recommendations 
for Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome 
Sequencing. Parts III and IV will dissect and critique the common 
arguments made in favor of a RNTK. Part III will explore the foundational 
philosophical literature that established the RNTK. In this section, I will 
 
 31. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 
14 (1991). 
 32. See Wenar, supra note 29, at §7.2. 
 33. See Andorno, supra note 28, at 435–37 (arguing that individuals may have a RNTK and 
that this right, while not absolute, strengthens autonomy and cannot be assumed). 
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argue that the RNTK does not enjoy the overwhelming support that modern 
commentators assert. Rather, a detailed analysis of the literature reveals that 
the legitimacy and coherence of the RNTK has actually been quite 
contested. Furthermore, even the more ardent supporters in this early 
literature qualify the right as being quite limited, in that it only applies in 
certain contexts and can be overridden with relative ease. Part IV will argue 
against a commonly asserted legal claim that the constitutional right to 
refuse medical treatment clearly also implies a right not to know medical 
information about oneself. Part V will then shift to a series of novel 
empirical and normative arguments, drawing on a range of psychological 
constructs (i.e., affective forecasting bias, identified victim effect) and areas 
of bioethical debate (i.e., moral distress, genetic exceptionalism) to suggest 
reasons why we should be skeptical of a strong right RNTK. I conclude by 
providing some recommendations about how best to balance individual 
autonomy and professional beneficence as the field of genomic medicine 
continues to evolve. 
 
II. EMERGENCE OF THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW CONTROVERSY 
A. Early Views on the Right Not To Know 
Researchers and bioethicists have been grappling with the problem of 
genetic incidental findings for over a decade. The National Bioethics 
Advisory Commission (“NBAC”) originally examined this issue in 1999, 
well before sequencing technology took its monumental leap forward.34 
Focusing on the research setting, the NBAC concluded that the default 
should be to not return individual research results, except in “exceptional 
circumstance[s].”35 Specifically, disclosure was only allowable if “a) the 
findings are scientifically valid and confirmed, b) the findings have 
significant implications for the subject’s health concerns, and c) a course of 
action to ameliorate or treat these concerns is readily available.”36 
Once next-generation sequencing technology became available, 
sentiment began shifting.37 Still focusing on the use of sequencing in 
research settings (since clinical adoption lagged a few years behind), 
scholars and researchers started debating whether researchers should have 
 
 34. 1 NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL 
MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE (1999). 
 35. Id. at 72. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Teri A. Manolio, Taking Our Obligations to Research Participants Seriously: Disclosing 
Individual Results of Genetic Research, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 32, 33 (2006). 
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an obligation to disclose incidental findings,38 and later whether there 
should be a further positive obligation to search for certain high value 
variants.39 While there is still no consensus, the field seems to be moving 
towards accepting the view that researchers have some obligation to 
disclose incidental findings, although the precise limits of that obligation, 
and the circumstances under which it attaches, remain murky.40 
Although the incidental findings debate has been protracted and often 
quite heated, there was one issue that at least initially seemed 
 
 38. See, e.g., Paul Affleck, Is It Ethical to Deny Genetic Research Participants Individualised 
Results?, 35 J. MED. ETHICS 209 (2009); Laura M. Beskow, Considering the Nature of Individual 
Research Results, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 38 (2006); Ebony B. Bookman et al., Reporting Genetic 
Results in Research Studies: Summary and Recommendations of an NHLBI Working Group, 140A 
AM. J. MED. GENETICS 1033 (2006); Mildred K. Cho, Understanding Incidental Findings in the 
Context of Genetics and Genomics, 36 J. L. MED. ETHICS 280 (2008); Ellen Clayton & Lainie 
Ross, Implications of Disclosing Individual Results of Clinical Research, 295 JAMA 37 (2006); 
Lynn G. Dressler & Eric T. Juengst, Thresholds and Boundaries in the Disclosure of Individual 
Genetic Research Results, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 18 (2006); Conrad V. Fernandez & Charles Weijer, 
Obligations in Offering to Disclose Genetic Research Results, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 44 (2006); 
Morris W. Foster & Richard R. Sharp, Ethical Issues in Medical-Sequencing Research: 
Implications of Genotype–Phenotype Studies for Individuals and Populations, 15 HUM. MOL. 
GENETICS R45 (2006); Bartha M. Knoppers et al., The Emergence of an Ethical Duty to Disclose 
Genetic Research Results: International Perspectives, 14 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 1170 (2006); 
Fiona A. Miller et al., Duty to Disclose What? Querying the Putative Obligation to Return 
Research Results to Participants, 34 J. MED. ETHICS 210 (2008) [hereinafter Miller et al., Duty to 
Disclose?]; Franklin G. Miller et al., Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: What Do 
Investigators Owe Research Participants?, 36 J.L. MED. ETHICS 271 (2008); Pilar N. Ossorio, 
Letting the Gene Out of the Bottle: A Comment on Returning Individual Research Results to 
Participants, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 24 (2006); Vardit Ravitsky & Benjamin S. Wilfond, Disclosing 
Individual Genetic Results to Research Participants, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 8 (2006); Henry S. 
Richardson & Leah Belsky, The Ancillary-Care Responsibilities of Medical Researchers: An 
Ethical Framework for Thinking about the Clinical Care that Researchers Owe Their Subjects, 34 
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 25 (2004); David I. Shalowitz & Franklin G. Miller, Disclosing 
Individual Results of Clinical Research: Implications of Respect for Participants, 294 JAMA 737 
(2005); Susan M. Wolf, Introduction, 36 J.L. MED. ETHICS 216 (2008); Wolf et al., supra note 10. 
 39. Gliwa & Berkman, supra note 18, at 33. 
 40. See, e.g., id. (arguing that “opinion seems to be moving toward the idea that there is some 
obligation to offer to disclose a limited set of findings, generally understood as findings that meet 
an exacting standard of validity, severity, and actionability” but that “[e]ven among those who 
support the existence of an obligation to disclose, however, the contours of that obligation remain 
murky”); Lisa Eckstein et al., A Framework for Analyzing the Ethics of Disclosing Genetic 
Research Findings, 42 J.L. MED. ETHICS 190, 190 (2014) (“There appears to be an emerging (but 
disputed) view that researchers have some obligation to disclose some genetic findings to some 
research participants. The contours of this obligation, however, remain unclear.”); Ellen Wright 
Clayton & Amy L. McGuire, The Legal Risks of Returning Results of Genomics Research, 14 
GENETICS MED. 473, 473–74 (2012) (“There is substantial consensus that people should be 
offered results that could trigger interventions that are lifesaving or that could avert serious 
adverse health outcomes; there is somewhat less consensus about whether people should be 
offered results that may have reproductive implications or that could be personally meaningful.”); 
PCSBI, ANTICIPATE AND COMMUNICATE, supra note 13, at 23 (“In fact, there seems to be an 
emerging consensus in some contexts that practitioners have a duty to return some incidental 
findings—even if there is little consensus as to precisely which ones.”). 
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uncontroversial: the right not to know.41 While commentators were arguing 
about the circumstances under which there was an obligation to return 
individual findings, and which findings to return, there seemed to be broad 
support for the view that findings should only be returned when the 
research participant desires them.42 To the extent that there was an 
obligation on the part of researchers, that obligation was to offer individual 
findings to research subjects, which they could then elect to receive or 
refuse.43 Accordingly, there was wide agreement that researchers should 
discuss the RNTK with potential subjects, and should prospectively solicit 
subject preferences.44 Foreshadowing the impending controversy, some 
commentators voiced a concern that medical professionals would have 
difficulty not returning highly relevant medical information, but the 
 
 41. See PCSBI, ANTICIPATE AND COMMUNICATE, supra note 13, at 59 (“The autonomous 
patient also has a right not to know selected information and should be able to exercise this right 
(to the extent possible).”); see also BIOBANKS FOR RESEARCH, OP. GERMAN NATIONAL ETHICS 
COUNCIL 59 (2004) (“Finally, as a precaution, donors would have to be informed in advance of 
the possible results, so that they could exercise their right not to know.”). 
 42. See e.g., Richard R. Fabsitz et al., Ethical and Practical Guidelines for Reporting Genetic 
Research Results to Study Participants Updated Guidelines From a National Heart, Lung, and 
Blood INST. Working Group, 3 CIRCULATION CARDIOVASCULAR GENETICS 574, 575–76 (2010). 
While there was some dissent among the authors of that paper, they ultimately recommended to 
honor an individual’s decision not to know genetic information. Id. (“Although the Working 
Group was highly supportive of the right of study participants to opt-out of receiving genetic 
results, some Working Group members argued there may be exceptional circumstances where . . . 
the potential for reducing the harm associated with the finding is so compelling that . . . there is an 
ethical basis to override the wishes of the participant . . . . Because of the strong arguments in 
favor of respecting research participant choices and the lack of consensus in our group on 
overriding the participant’s decision in some circumstances, we recommend that when the 
participant has opted-in or opted-out of receiving results, the investigators honor that decision . . . 
.”). See also Timothy Caulfield et al., Research Ethics Recommendations for Whole-Genome 
Research: Consensus Statement, 6 PLOS BIOLOGY 430 (2008) (recommending that the informed 
consent process “should acknowledge the participants’ right not to know certain results.”); PCSBI, 
ANTICIPATE AND COMMUNICATE supra note 13, at 59 (“The autonomous patient also has a right 
not to know selected information and should be able to exercise this right (to the extent 
possible).”); GERMAN NAT’L ETHICS COUNCIL, BIOBANKS FOR RESEARCH 59 (2004), 
http://www.ethikrat.org/files/ner_opinion_biobanks.pdf (“Finally, as a precaution, donors would 
have to be informed in advance of the possible results, so that they could exercise their right not to 
know.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Wolf et al., supra note 10, at 231 (“The literature on returning research results 
cautions that such results should be offered to research participants, not foisted upon them. This is 
consistent with the literature on genetic testing in particular, which recognizes a right not to know 
results.”); see also Bartha M. Knoppers, Introduction: From the Right to Know to the Right Not to 
Know, 42 J.L. MED. ETHICS 6, 6 (2014) (“Respect for the autonomy of research participants 
recognizes that all individuals have the right to make their own decision.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Fabsitz et al., supra note 42, at 575 (arguing that incidental findings should only 
be offered “during the informed consent process or subsequently, [where] the study participant has 
opted to receive his or her individual genetic results.”); Knoppers, supra note 43, at 6. 
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prevailing view was that rigorous informed consent could ameliorate this 
problem.45 
Buttressing this apparent early consensus was a set of international 
instruments that increasingly seemed to provide legal recognition for the 
RNTK. The UNESCO Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights (1997) gave individuals the right “to decide whether or not 
to be informed of the results of genetic examination and the resulting 
consequences should be respected.”46 Similarly, the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997) declared that “the wishes of 
individuals not to be so informed shall be observed” because “[p]atients 
may have their own reasons for not wishing to know about certain aspects 
of their health.”47 Individual countries also passed laws specifically 
recognizing an individual’s right not to know diagnostic (genetic) 
information.48 
B. The Right Not to Know Controversy 
These early views on the RNTK were expressed in the nascent days of 
genomic medicine, before large-scale genomic sequencing had emerged.49 
As sequencing technology advanced, and particularly as it moved from the 
research setting into the clinical realm, the debate began to slowly shift 
away from the clear consensus view that an individual has a strong RNTK 
genetic information about oneself.50 There were two related reasons for this 
shift. First, the utility of genomic sequencing was improving.51 An 
increasing number of genetic variants had been strongly linked to a range of 
phenotypes where knowledge of one’s genetic status could have a profound 
 
 45. Wolf et al., supra note 10, at 231 (discussing the fact that “researchers may 
understandably be hesitant to accept a research participant’s waiver of information about an IF 
likely to be life-threatening or grave and ameliorable, unless the participant appreciates that the 
information being waived may be of high health importance.”). 
 46. Universal Declaration on Human Genome and Human Rights, G.A. Res. 31, ¶ 16, 29th 
Sess., U.N. DOC. A/RES/ 29/31, at 43 (Oct. 21, 1997). 
 47. Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Apr. 4, 1997, CETS No. 164, 4, 11, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/164.htm. 
 48. See, e.g., TRI-COUNCIL WORKING GROUP, TRI-COUNCIL POLICY STATEMENT: ETHICAL 
CONDUCT FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMANS 183 (2010), 
http://www.pre.ethics.gc.ca/pdf/eng/tcps2/TCPS_2_FINAL_Web.pdf (“Since the right to privacy 
includes a right not to know, researchers shall give participants options for receiving or refusing 
different types of information.”). 
 49. See, e.g., Jarvik et al., supra note 17, at 818 (examining how next-generation sequencing 
affects the process of returning results to patients). 
 50. See, e.g., id. 
 51. See id. (discussing how the advancements in sequencing technology created a need to 
address questions about the RNTK). 
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impact on treatments for (or prevention of) serious disease.52 Second, a 
growing number of patients were being sequenced,53 leading to reasonable 
projections about the important role that genomic sequencing would have as 
a regular part of clinical care.54  
It was in response to this new reality that the American College of 
Medical Genetics and Genomics (“ACMG”) issued their “ACMG 
Recommendations for Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome 
and Genome Sequencing.”55 Their goal was to start a conversation about 
clinical standards for managing the predictable onslaught of medically 
relevant incidental findings.56 
The Recommendations contained a number of more and less 
controversial elements. On the less disputed end, they articulated a 
“minimum list” of fifty-seven (later reduced to fifty-six) genes, and a subset 
of variants that predispose to twenty-four disorders that “would likely have 
medical benefit for the patients and families of patients undergoing clinical 
sequencing.”57 Considering both the weight of the scientific evidence and 
the clinical implications of knowing the genetic information, they limited 
the list to “unequivocally pathogenic mutations in genes where pathogenic 
variants lead to disease with very high probability and where evidence 
 
 52. See, e.g., Leslie G. Biesecker, Opportunities and Challenges for the Integration of 
Massively Parallel Genomic Sequencing into Clinical Practice: Lessons from the ClinSeq Project, 
14 GENETICS MED. 393, 395–96 (2012) (considering the clinical practicalities of genomic 
sequencing and how it affects the RNTK); Jonathan S. Berg et al., Deploying Whole Genome 
Sequencing in Clinical Practice and Public Health: Meeting the Challenge One Bin at a Time, 13 
GENETICS MED. 499, 499 (2011) (discussing the impact of new technology for whole genome 
sequencing on clinical practice and public health). 
 53. See Manolio et al., supra note 6, at 259 (articulating how the acceptance of genomic 
medicine has caused an increase in participating sites for clinical application).   
 54. See Green et al., supra note 7, at 209 (“Genomic discoveries will increasingly advance the 
science of medicine in the coming decades, as important advances are made in developing 
improved diagnostics, more effective therapeutic strategies, an evidence-based approach for 
demonstrating clinical efficacy, and better decision-making tools for patient and providers.”); see 
also Editorial, The Human Genome at Ten, 464 NATURE 649, 650 (2010) (asserting that genomic 
sequencing has been accompanied by unprecedented success in the scientific community that will 
have powerful applications to human health in the coming decades). 
 55. Robert C. Green et al., ACMG Recommendations for Reporting of Incidental Findings in 
Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing, 15 GENETICS MED. 565, 565–66 (2013) [hereinafter 
ACMG Recommendations]. 
 56. Their recommendations were explicitly limited to the clinical context; they intentionally 
bracketed genomic sequencing done for research purposes, although there is an ongoing debate 
about the influence that clinical recommendations and guidelines should have in the research 
realm. See, e.g., Jarvik et al., supra note 17, at 817–19 (recognizing that the ACMG 
Recommendations, which specifically address incidental findings in clinical settings, provided 
researchers with new considerations in their ongoing debate on reporting genetic results). 
 57. ACMG Recommendations, supra note 55, at 567; see also Anastasia Richardson, 
Incidental Findings and Future Testing Methodologies: Potential Application of the ACMG 2013 
Recommendations, 28 J.L. BIOSCIENCES 378, 381 (2014). 
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strongly supports the benefits of early intervention.”58 While other 
researchers and organizations would certainly disagree about the variants 
that were and were not included, the Working Group did not intend for this 
to be a definitive list.59 Acknowledging the there was insufficient data to 
make confident “evidence-based recommendations,” the ACMG working 
group used the best available literature and clinical consensus to derive their 
product.60 In addressing the limitations of this approach, the committee 
explicitly articulated an expectation that this list would actively evolve over 
time.61 
More controversially, the Working Group recommended that the 
laboratory should actively seek the variants on the list.62 This directly 
contradicted much of the early incidental findings literature that argued 
against the need to actively interrogate genomic data looking for incidental 
findings.63 They characterized this approach as “opportunistic screening,” 
asserting that even if there was insufficient evidence of cost-effectiveness to 
warrant population-level screening for these variants, disclosure is justified 
by the fact that a patient has presented him or herself to a physician who is 
in a position to provide an important medical benefit.64 
Most controversially,65 the Working Group argued against soliciting 
patient preferences about receiving (or not receiving) incidental findings.66 
 
 58. ACMG Recommendations, supra note 55, at 567. 
 59. Id. See also Laura M. Amendola et al., Actionable Exomic Incidental Findings in 6503 
Participants: Challenges of Variant Classification, 25 GENOME RES. 305, 305–06 (2015) 
(recognizing limitations of the pathogenic variants identified in the ACMG Recommendations and 
finding additional genes associated with medically actionable disorders in individuals with 
European and African ancestries). 
 60. See ACMG Recommendations, supra note 55, at 567. 
 61. See id. (acknowledging that the ACMG Recommendations are based on clinical 
experience from “patients with disease symptoms or family histories” and will likely change as 
evidence becomes available from “persons without symptoms or family history”). 
 62. See id. 
 63. Gliwa & Berkman, supra note 18, at 33 (“In other words, when researchers generate and 
interrogate sequence data, do they have any obligation to actively look within the data for 
potential variants associated with severe or life-threatening diseases? The standard view has been 
that ‘researchers generally have no obligation to act as clinicians and affirmatively search for IFs,’ 
but this assumption seems to be relatively unexamined.”) (quoting Wolf et al., supra note 10, at 
236)). See also, Cho, supra note 38, at 283 (questioning whether researchers are obliged to sift 
through and analyze all collected samples to uncover findings that are unrelated to their research); 
Miller et al., Duty to Disclose?, supra note 38, at 212 (suggesting that basing differential 
obligations to disclose on the veracity of the genomic data analysis will render unfavorable 
outcomes); Brian Van Ness, Genomic Research and Incidental Findings, 36 J.L. MED. ETHICS 
292, 296 (2008) (arguing against the necessity of a directed effort to find genetic variation 
unrelated to the goals of the study). 
 64. ACMG Recommendations, supra note 55, at 572. 
 65. While not within the scope of this article, it should be noted that the Working Group also 
controversially recommended the disclosure of adult-onset conditions to pediatric patients, which 
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They did not think that it was appropriate to give patients a choice not to 
learn about clinically important and actionable findings, advancing the 
claim that clinicians have a fiduciary duty to warn patients about high-risk 
variants where an intervention is available.67 They were also concerned that 
it would be unduly burdensome to translate the rigorous informed consent 
procedures used in targeted genetic testing to the enormous range of results 
that genomic sequencing could produce.68 The Working Group contended 
that this did not remove a patient’s opportunity to make an autonomous 
choice; if patients were uncomfortable with the prospect of learning about 
incidental findings, they maintained the right to refuse the test altogether.69  
The recommendation against soliciting patient preferences for not 
knowing genetic information ignited an extended (and often quite spirited) 
debate within the research ethics community.70 A relatively small set of 
commentators tried to defend the call for mandatory disclosure of high 
value incidental findings.71 The overwhelming majority view, however, 
 
represented a substantial break from the prevailing view, arguing that benefit to parents and other 
family members outweighed concerns about protecting the child’s future autonomy. See id. at 568. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. The ACMG Recommendations do concede that findings would be delivered to the 
ordering clinician, who could manage the information in the context of the patient’s specific 
circumstances. See id. at 567 (“It was expected that this clinician would contextualize any 
incidental findings for the patient in light of personal and family history, physical examination, 
and other relevant findings. This places responsibility for managing incidental findings with the 
ordering clinician, because we believe that the clinician-patient interaction is the appropriate place 
for such information to be explained and discussed.”). While this language could be read to imply 
that patient preferences should be sought within the context of the doctor-patient relationship, the 
ACMG Recommendations do not make this point explicitly, and the overwhelming weight of the 
documents arguments suggest another reading, as will be discussed below. 
 68. Id. at 568. 
 69. ACMG Recommendations, supra note 55, at 568 (“Patients have the right to decline 
clinical sequencing if they judge the risks of possible discovery of incidental findings to outweigh 
the benefits of testing.”). 
 70. See James P. Evans, Finding Common Ground, 15 GENETICS MED. 852, 852 (2013) 
(“[H]aving read (way too many) positions on this matter, listened to strong (but thankfully, largely 
polite) debate, and obsessed (way too much) about it.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Benjamin E. Berkman & Sara Chandros Hull, The “Right Not to Know” in the 
Genomic Era: Time to Break From Tradition?, 14 AM. J. BIOETHICS 28, 29–30 (2014) 
(advocating for mandatory disclosure by undermining the RNTK paradigm); Effy Vayena & John 
Tasioulas, Genetic Incidental Findings: Autonomy Regained?, 15 GENETICS MED. 868, 868–69 
(2013) (proposing mandatory disclosure of incidental findings to provide valuable, life-shaping 
and life-saving choices that ultimately enhance the patient’s autonomy); Amy L. McGuire et al., 
Ethics and Genomic Incidental Findings, 340 SCIENCE 1047, 1047–48 (2013) (arguing in favor of 
the ACMG Recommendations as they likely promote patient health, contain ethical standards that 
actually exceed the legal standards in most states, and afford safeguards for patients deciding 
against receiving incidental finding information); Leslie G. Biesecker, Incidental Variants Are 
Critical for Genomics, 92 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 648, 648–49 (2013) (claiming that the potential 
advances in healthcare posed by reporting incidental findings will not be realized if researchers 
are not obligated to identify and return results to patients with life-threatening predispositions to 
diseases); James P. Evans, Finding Common Ground, 15 GENETICS MED. 852, 853 (2013) 
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was extremely critical of the recommendation, holding that patients have a 
strong RNTK, and that any abrogation of that right was inappropriate.72 As 
one paper put it, the ACMG statement was “an instance of paternalistic 
overreach” that should be “widely rejected as inconsistent with the ethical 
and legal duties of clinicians.”73 
The arguments against the recommendations generally focused on 
patient autonomy, appealing to the long history of shared medical decision-
making and respect for patient preferences.  For example, as an 
impressively credentialed group of bioethicists forcefully argued: 
However, choice matters. Patients may wish to decline the 
additional analysis on a number of grounds . . . . Concepts of 
shared decision making and respect for patient preferences argue 
for offering meaningful choices wherever possible, with 
appropriate information to allow patients to choose the best 
option for themselves . . . . If patients decline additional testing, it 
follows that the laboratory should not perform the additional 
analyses.74 
 
(advocating for the examination of the fifty-six variants described in the ACMG recommendation 
by default, yet expressing discomfort in the illusory degree of autonomy afforded to patients in 
allowing them to opt of examination). The arguments advanced in these articles will be examined 
in more detail in Part V. 
 72. See, e.g., Wylie Burke et al., Recommendations for Returning Genomic Incidental 
Findings? We Need to Talk!, 15 GENETICS MED. 854 (2013); Susan M. Wolf et al., Patient 
Autonomy and Incidental Findings in Clinical Genomics, 340 SCIENCE 1049 (2013) [hereinafter 
Wolf et al., Patient Autonomy]; David S. Rosenblatt, Commentary, Who’s on First in Exome and 
Whole Genome Sequencing? Is it the Patient or the Incidental Findings?, 110 MOLECULAR 
GENETICS METABOLISM 1 (2013); Lainie F. Ross et al., Mandatory Extended Searches in All 
Genome Sequencing: “Incidental Findings,” Patient Autonomy, and Shared Decision Making, 
310 JAMA 368 (2013); Megan Allyse & Marsha Michie, Not-So-Incidental Findings: The ACMG 
Recommendations on the Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical Whole Genome and Whole 
Exome Sequencing, 31 TRENDS BIOTECH. 439 (2013); Nat’l Soc’y of Genetic Counselors, NSGC 
Responds to ACMG Recommendations for Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome 
and Genome Sequencing, NSGC.ORG (Mar. 27, 2013), http://nsgc.org/p/bl/et/blogid= 
45&blogaid=18; Anne Townsend et al., Paternalism and the ACMG Recommendations on 
Genomic Incidental Findings: Patients Seen But Not Heard, 15 GENETICS MED. 751 (2013); 
Robert Klitzman et al., Return of Secondary Genomic Findings vs. Patient Autonomy: 
Implications for Medical Care, 310 JAMA 369 (2013); Susan M. Wolf, Return of Individual 
Research Results and Incidental Findings: Facing the Challenges of Translational Science, 14 
ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 557 (2013); Neil A. Holtzman, ACMG 
Recommendations on Incidental Findings are Flawed Scientifically and Ethically, 15 GENETICS 
MED. 750 (2013); Jarvik et al., supra note 17; Gabriel Lázaro-Muñoz et al., Looking for Trouble: 
Preventive Genomic Sequencing in the General Population and the Role of Patient Choice, 15 
AM. J. BIOETHICS 3 (2015); Susan B. Trinidad et al., Looking for Trouble and Finding It, 15 AM. 
J. BIOETHICS 15 (2015); Annelien L. Bredenoord et al., Next Generation DNA Sequencing: 
Always Allow an Opt Out, 15 AM. J. BIOETHICS 28 (2015). 
 73. Trinidad et al., supra note 72, at 15. 
 74. Burke et al., supra note 72, at 857. 
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The support for this line of reasoning was extensive,75 and critics often 
further supported their argument by claiming that there is good reason to 
think that many people do not want to learn certain kinds of genetic 
information about themselves.76  
Even more interesting was the fact that these autonomy-focused views 
were often couched in relatively absolute terms.77 Commentators were not 
blind to the fact that strongly preferencing the RNTK meant that some 
patients might not receive information that could save their lives.78 
Although not expressed in exclusively principlistic language, these 
arguments essentially seem to advance the view that autonomy should 
trump beneficence in RNTK situations. For example, as one commentator 
put it: “Patients have the right to refuse testing and findings, even if 
potentially lifesaving. Just because many patients might want this 
information does not mean that it can or should be imposed on all.”79 
Similarly, a number of commentators cited the legal right to refuse medical 
 
 75. See Wolf et al., Patient Autonomy, supra note 72, at 1049 (“Informed consent is a well-
established legal requirement designed to protect patient autonomy – not a matter susceptible to 
modification by experts in human genetics, no matter how learned.”); Ross et al., supra note 72, at 
368 (“Implementing mandatory testing for conditions beyond the scope of the original request is 
in conflict with key ethical principles of patient autonomy and shared decision making.”); Allyse 
& Michie, supra note 72, at 439 (“[T]he implication that individual autonomy should be over-
ridden by physicians for the patient’s ‘own good’ is weakly supported in modern clinical ethics.”); 
Nat’l Soc’y of Genetic Counselors, supra note 72 (“The recently published ACMG 
recommendations represent a break from past practices, which prioritized a patient’s right not to 
know genetic information that was predictive rather than diagnostic in nature.”); Townsend et. al., 
supra note 72, at 751 (“The traditionally paternalistic model of medicine, underpinned by values 
and assumptions about passive patient and authoritative physician roles, is increasingly criticized 
by patients, advocacy groups, health policy makers, and many physicians.”); Klitzman et al., 
supra note 72, at 370 (“A balance between beneficence and paternalism would seem to be 
optimal, but striking such a fine balance may prove to be difficult.”); Jarvik et al., supra note 17, 
at 820 (“Participants should have the right to refuse any results that are offered. Potential research 
participants . . . should be provided proper informed consent that respects autonomy, including the 
right to refuse participation in research.”). 
 76. Rosenblatt, supra note 72, at 1 (“In the experience of this physician, it is not common 
practise [sic] for the patient or parent to want to know about all health issues unrelated to the 
reason they are consulting their health professional.”); Townsend et al., supra note 72, at 752 (“In 
a qualitative study, we explored patient, public, and professional views of disclosing genomic 
incidental findings . . . . They emphasized having ‘the power’ to choose disclosure or not, and that 
patients no longer accept medical paternalism.”); Klitzman et al., supra note 72, at 369 
(“Currently, many well-informed individuals with known family histories of cancer syndromes . . . 
choose to forgo or defer genetic testing, given that disease manifestations and timing cannot be 
predicted.”); Jarvik et al., supra note 17, at 822 (“Participant preferences might play a role in the 
choice of which research results should be returned in that all participants might not choose the 
same options as those deemed to be clinically significant.”). 
 77. See Townsend et al., supra note 72, at 752. 
 78. See Burke et al., supra note 72, at 857. See also Wolf et al., Patient Autonomy, supra note 
72, at 1050 (explaining that allowing patients the right not to know means that they may not 
receive potentially lifesaving findings). 
 79. Wolf et al., Patient Autonomy, supra note 72, at 1050. 
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interventions, arguing that an individual’s ability to place limits on 
treatments also implies a legal right to refuse medical information.80  
In addition to the primary autonomy argument, critics of the ACMG 
Recommendations discussed a number of other concerns. First, some took 
issue with ACMG’s claim that patients still had a choice, namely whether 
or not get their genome sequenced.81 Critics worried that it would be 
coercive to make clinically indicated genomic sequencing contingent on 
agreement to analyze and disclose incidental findings.82 Relatedly, some 
raised concerns that this forced choice would cause some patients to forgo 
medically necessary sequencing to avoid learning unwanted genetic 
information.83 
Second, many critics pointed to a variety of ways in which unwanted 
genetic information could harm patients.84 Most prominent were 
 
 80. See infra Part IV.  
 81. See Wolf et al., Patient Autonomy, supra note 72, at 1049 (explaining that patients had no 
opportunity to decline unwanted information because the ACMG makes clinicians “report the 
results of the deliberate search for incidental findings to the patient . . . [thus] [t]he patient’s only 
choice is to decline sequencing altogether . . . ”); see also Ross et al., supra note 72, at 368 
(stating that the ACMG Recommendations violate patient autonomy because they leave patients 
with an all-or-nothing decision); Klitzman et al., supra note 72, at 369 (explaining how 
proponents claim that patients have a choice whether to undergo exome sequencing, while 
opponents argue that patients may require testing for diagnosis and treatment of their specified 
conditions but may not wish to be tested for other conditions). 
 82. See Rosenblatt, supra note 72, at 1 (“Were the ACMG guidelines to reach the level of 
‘standard of care,’ many clinicians, including myself, would avoid clinical exome sequencing to 
spare both my patients and me the added strains of coerced screening.”); Allyse & Michie, supra 
note 72, at 440 (“The assertion that ‘patients have the right to decline clinical sequencing if they 
judge the risks of possible discovery of incidental findings to outweigh the benefits of testing’ 
borders on the coercive.”); Townsend et al., supra note 72, at 752 (“Another key concern 
prompted by the ACMG recommendations is the notion of coercive consent to testing and 
disclosure for vulnerable patients desperate to find the cause of a serious disorder.”); Jarvik et al., 
supra note 17, at 822 (“Participation in research studies should be as noncoercive and respectful 
of participants as possible . . . . Framing the conversation as ‘if we find . . . would you want’ 
avoids the potentially coercive ‘we have . . . do you want.’ ”). 
 83. Burke et al., supra note 72, at 857 (explaining that without the option to refuse additional 
findings, patients may refuse genomic testing when it is recommended); Ross et al., supra note 72, 
at 368. (“Mandating analysis and reporting beyond that recommended by the ordering clinician 
may lead to harm if patients and clinicians decide to avoid testing in order to avoid unwanted 
information.”); Townsend et al., supra note 72, at 752 (“Some patients who prefer nondisclosure 
may decline whole-genome sequencing even though by doing so they lose the opportunity to end 
their diagnostic odyssey.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Wolf et al., Patient Autonomy, supra note 72, at 1049 (recognizing that 
unwanted information may harm the patient by causing anxiety as well as unnecessary procedures 
and interventions); see also Burke et al., supra note 72, at 858 (noting that the classification of 
healthy people as “sick” may cause them to undergo expensive and unnecessary procedures); 
Klitzman et al., supra note 72, at 369 (identifying children as “at-risk” may harm their 
development). 
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psychosocial concerns such as stigma, discrimination, and anxiety.85 There 
were also worries about the iatrogenic and economic impact of unnecessary 
follow-up procedures and interventions, both on the individual and 
population levels.86 
Finally, critics claimed that there was not adequate evidence to support 
the recommendation to engage in opportunistic screening.87 Critics worried 
that our knowledge about the link between genotypes and phenotypes is not 
yet robust enough to make the specific claims contained in the ACMG 
recommendations.88 There were concerns about the prior predictive value 
problem; since existing evidence was based on studies involving affected 
families, critics argued that it is premature to assume similar penetrance in 
families without a history of the disease because there could be as yet 
unidentified mitigating genetic features that could reduce or eliminate 
risk.89 Invoking the precautionary principle, these critics argued that we 
should avoid returning incidental information until we can be more certain 
that doing so will help rather than harm patients.90 Finally, critics pointed to 
the lack of scientific validity and reliability in existing sequencing 
platforms and the resultant risk of false negatives.91  
As the academic community was vigorously critiquing the ACMG 
recommendations, a growing body of evidence indicated that genetics 
professionals shared many of these concerns. In one national survey of 
 
 85. See, e.g., Klitzman et al., supra note 72, at 369 (arguing that incidental findings will cause 
anxiety and stigma in certain communities); Lazaro-Muñoz et al., supra note 72, at 11 (concluding 
that incidental findings will increase the chances of genetic discrimination).  
 86. Burke et al., supra note 72, at 858 (“[C]areful consideration must be given to potential 
harms, both to the individual tested and to the health-care system. These harms include adverse 
labeling of health people as ‘sick,’ unnecessary health-care expenditures, and iatrogenic 
complications.”); Wolf et al., Patient Autonomy, supra note 72, at 1049 (“Inflicting unwanted 
information on patients carries its own risks, as unwanted information may lead to anxiety, further 
clinical workup, and potentially burdensome interventions.”); Ross et al., supra note 72, at 368 
(“Mandating analysis and reporting beyond that recommended by the ordering clinician may lead 
to harm if patients and clinicians decide to avoid testing in order to avoid unwanted 
information.”); Allyse & Michie, supra note 72, at 439–40 (arguing that “extra testing will place 
an added burden on laboratories” that could lead to increased costs that might not be covered by 
insurance); Klitzman et al., supra note 72, at 369 (“Such erroneous classification could cause 
anxiety and lead patients to inappropriately seek expensive medical screening . . . or unwarranted 
procedures such as prophylactic mastectomy.”);  
 87. Klitzman et al., supra note 72, at 369 (“Until well-curated human mutation databases are 
available, patients may be told about many mutations that, because of incomplete penetrance and 
misclassification of benign variants as mutations, are likely neither to cause disease nor confer 
substantial risk when ascertained in the general population.”); Holtzman, supra note 72, at 750 
(“The evidence to support these beliefs is insufficient to constitute reporting them as ‘the standard 
of care.’”). 
 88. Klitzman, supra note 72, at 369. 
 89. Holtzman, supra note 72, at 750. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id.  
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genetics professionals, 81% of respondents thought that individual patient 
preferences should be honored when deciding which results to return.92 
Another qualitative study found consensus support for the view that 
autonomy and informed consent were of vital importance when returning 
results.93 In response to the mounting criticism of their recommendations, 
ACMG published a policy statement that clarified their position without 
making any substantive changes.94 Eventually, however, ACMG retreated 
from their position.95 Citing a “consensus among ACMG members,” the 
organization refined their position to state that before the sample is sent for 
analysis “patients should have an opportunity to opt out of the analysis of 
medically actionable genes when undergoing whole exome or genome 
sequencing.”96  
It should be noted that in the course of this debate, the President’s 
Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues published a report on 
incidental findings, broadly considering the issue across a range of contexts 
(i.e., research, clinical, direct to consumer testing) and technologies (e.g., 
genetics, imaging, etc.).97 While the Commission did not go into extensive 
detail about the RNTK, the report did briefly address whether or not there 
should be limits on a clinician’s obligation to respect a patient’s preference 
not to know genetic information.98 The Commission rightly pointed out that 
grappling with incidental findings requires balancing two competing 
principles, respect for persons and beneficence.99  
Consistent with the majority view, however, there is an emphasis 
throughout the document on soliciting and respecting patient preferences 
for managing incidental findings, including the RNTK.100 The Commission 
did nevertheless seem to leave room to override an autonomous choice. 
 
 92. Joon-Ho Yu et al., Attitudes of Genetics Professionals Toward the Return of Incidental 
Results from Exome and Whole-Genome Sequencing, 95 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 77, 79 (2014). 
 93. Megan E. Grove et al., Views of Genetics Health Professionals on the Return of Genomic 
Results, 23 J. GENETICS COUNSELING 531, 532–33 (2013). 
 94. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF MEDICAL GENETICS & GENOMICS, Incidental Findings in 
Clinical Genomics: A Clarification, 15 GENETICS MED. 664, 664–65 (2013).  
 95. See ACMG Updates Recommendation on “Opt Out” for Genome Sequencing Return, 
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF MEDICAL GENETICS & GENOMICS (Apr. 1, 2014), 
https://www.acmg.net/docs/Release_ACMGUpdatesRecommendations_final.pdf.  
 96. Id. 
 97. See PCSBI, ANTICIPATE AND COMMUNICATE, supra note 13, at 22. 
 98. Id. at 59. 
 99. Id. at 61 (“Beneficence demands that a physician use professional judgment to determine 
whether disclosure would do more harm than good for the particular patient, and respect for 
persons requires that a patient’s preferences be ascertained, preferably before testing.”). 
 100. PCSBI, ANTICIPATE AND COMMUNICATE, supra note 13, at 4, 5, 10, 30, 44, 59, 61, 63, 64, 
66, 78, 83 (2013) (recognizing the importance of patient autonomy and consistently asserting that 
respect for persons requires that the autonomous individual should be encouraged to express 
preferences regarding secondary and incidental findings before testing). 
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Specifically, the Commission recommended that “clinicians should respect 
a patient’s preference not to know about incidental or secondary findings to 
the extent consistent with the clinician’s fiduciary duty.”101 Similarly, they 
assert that “if patients wish to opt out of receiving incidental or secondary 
findings that are clinically significant, actionable, and of serious importance 
to their health, then clinicians should exercise discretion.”102  
Overall, while the Commission’s position on the RNTK seems to be 
much less strident than many of the other commentators in the 
contemporaneous literature, they also did not firmly defend the ACMG 
view. While representing a step away from the majority view, the 
Commission did not challenge the underlying appropriateness of the RNTK 
in a genomic era, given the obvious and inevitable conflict between 
autonomy and beneficence that such a right creates. Nor do they rigorously 
explore when and why it might be acceptable to override a patient’s RNTK, 
and whether it would be appropriate to abandon the consensus position that 
preferences have to be proactively solicited. I take up these challenges in 
the subsequent sections.103  
 
 101. Id. at 64. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See infra Parts III, IV, V. 
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III. THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF THE RNTK: AN UNEXPECTEDLY 
CONTESTED CONCEPT 
The RNTK genetic information is a relatively new idea, first appearing 
in the literature in the 1970s and 80s104 but not really gaining traction until 
the 1990s.105 A substantial body of work developed in the subsequent 
decade, concurrent with the gradual incorporation of genetic testing into 
clinical medicine.106 While there appears to be significant recent support 
for the RNTK, a robust examination of the concept must begin with an 
analysis of the idea’s philosophical origins. Contemporary RNTK advocates 
have had a tendency to present their views in the absence of this historical 
perspective, seemingly arguing that a strong, autonomy-based RNTK is 
self-evident.107 In contrast to this assumption, I believe that a close 
examination of the earlier RNTK literature reveals a much more 
controverted and nuanced history.108  Specifically, I will demonstrate that 
acceptance of a strict RNTK is far from universal in the philosophical 
 
 104. Robert M. Veatch, Three Theories of Informed Consent: Philosophical Foundations and 
Policy Implications, in THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, APPENDIX II 6, 8–9, 50 (Nat’l Comm’n for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical & Behavioral Research ed., 1978); Ost, supra note 
27. 
 105. See, e.g., Torleiv Austad, The Right Not to Know–Worthy of Preservation Any Longer? 
An Ethical Perspective, 50 CLIN. GENETICS 85, 86 (1996) (explaining that the RNTK gained 
significant traction in the 1990s after studies found that the burden of genetic information had the 
potential to cause serious psychological harm); see Juha Räikkä, Freedom and a Right (Not) to 
Know, 12 BIOETHICS 49, 50 (1998) (analyzing the relationship between the moral right to know 
and the RNTK genetic information to prevent “harmful personal consequences”); Weaver, supra 
note 22, at 243 (1997); Rosamond Rhodes, Genetic Links, Family Ties, and Social Bonds: Rights 
and Responsibilities in the Face of Genetic Knowledge, 23 J. MED. PHIL. 10, 11 (1998) 
(examining the moral responsibilities and effects that exercise of the RNTK has on third parties); 
Graeme Laurie, In Defence of Ignorance: Genetic Information and the Right not to Know, 6 EUR. 
J. HEALTH L. 119, 130 (1999) [hereinafter Laurie, In Defence of Ignorance] (concluding that the 
field of bioethics is witnessing a new era which expressly recognizes an interest in not knowing 
genetic information); Graeme Laurie, Protecting and Promoting Privacy in an Uncertain World: 
Further Defences of Ignorance and the Right Not to Know, 7 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 185, 188 (2000) 
[hereinafter Laurie, Privacy in an Uncertain World] (arguing that the RNTK can be circumvented 
by medical practitioners, either internationally, or unintentionally, by disclosing information 
before an individual unequivocally elects to exercise this right); Tuija Takala, The Right to 
Genetic Ignorance Confirmed, 13 BIOETHICS 288, 289 (1999) (examining the psychological 
benefits of genetic ignorance, and the harm it can have on others). 
 106. See Chadwick et al., supra note 25, at 13, 19 (explaining that since 1997, the emergence 
of genetic testing in clinical medicine greatly contributed to the developments in RNTK); see also 
Rhodes, supra note 105, at 11 (analyzing the responsibilities and rights of individuals with respect 
to the emergence of genetic testing and genetic knowledge). 
 107. See, e.g., Andorno, supra note 28, at 435. 
 108. In this section, I will exclusively be analyzing the earlier RNTK literature, drawing a line 
at 2007, around the advent of next-generation sequencing. This new technology is ethically 
relevant because it changed the magnitude and likelihood of concerns that before that point had 
been primarily theoretical. See Tabor et al., supra note 8, at 2917. 
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literature, and that even staunch proponents recognize that the RNTK can 
be easily overridden by competing considerations. 
A. The Arguments for a Strong RNTK 
Most commonly, scholars ground the RNTK in autonomy, arguing that 
one’s right to self-determination implies a right to make decisions about 
learning (or not learning) sensitive medical information.109 These authors 
typically build their argument on a foundational assertion that genetic 
information has the potential to cause psychological and economic harm.110 
While often granting that more information can allow for improved 
decision-making regarding future plans, they stress that for some 
individuals, this information can lead to anxiety, depression, stigma and 
even discrimination.111 Therefore, an individual should be afforded the 
freedom to weigh the risk of psychosocial and economic harms against the 
potential benefit that the knowledge might provide.112 
Beyond this basic argument, RNTK proponents often focus their 
reasoning on a number of specific themes. Most commonly, a number of 
scholars cite concerns about paternalism in medical care, making claims it 
has no place in modern medicine, even if justified by seemingly reasonable 
considerations.113 For example, Tuija Takala argues that: 
 
 109. See, e.g., Andorno, supra note 28, at 435 (2004) (“This paper argues that ‘autonomy,’ 
understood in a wide sense, provides a theoretical basis for a right not to know one’s genetic 
status.”); Jonathan Herring & Charles Foster, “Please Don’t Tell Me”, 21 CAMBRIDGE Q. 
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 20, 28 (2012) (finding that although the RNTK enhances personal 
autonomy, the right is not absolute because “it can and sometimes should be outweighed by other 
considerations”); Austad, supra note 105, at 86 (denoting that the RNTK has been predominately 
motivated by the severe psychological consequences that can arise from an individual’s cognition 
of their genetic abnormalities); Weaver, supra note 22, at 270, 273 (explaining that the RNTK 
ensures an individual has complete autonomy in their decision regarding the disclosure of their 
genetic information); Takala, supra note 105, at 292 (reasoning that a truly autonomous decision 
“implies a duty of self-determination,” and that an individual must consider all of the relevant 
information regarding the disclosure of the genetic defect). 
 110. See Austad, supra note 105, at 86 (“There is reason to believe that increasing knowledge 
about genetic predispositions could be an extra burden, at least for some.”); see also Weaver, 
supra note 22, at 243 (“[S]uch knowledge can lead to anxious preoccupation with the ever present 
disease potential within, and discrimination by employers, insurers, governmental agencies, and 
health care providers without.”); see also Andorno, supra note 28, at 435 (“[O]ne has to consider 
that the burden of knowledge may become unbearable for them, leading to a severe psychological 
depression and having a negative impact on their family life and on their social relationships in 
general.”). 
 111. See Andorno, supra note 28, at 435 (noting that the burden of knowledge that coalesces 
with the acquiring of genetic information can lead to negative psychological consequences). 
 112. Id. at 437. 
 113. See, e.g., Tuija Takala, Genetic Ignorance and Reasonable Paternalism, 22 THEORETICAL 
MED. BIOETHICS 485, 490 (2001). 
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If a person’s own judgment can be overridden by considerations 
of the “reasonable,” as defined by the profession, or by ethicists 
for that matter, we must forget the principle of autonomy at the 
outset, or at least find its applications extremely limited. It seems 
that by accepting the rhetorics of “what the reasonable person 
would do,” we re-introduce the practice of paternalism to medical 
ethics.114 
Takala clearly dismisses the idea of requiring a person to obtain 
knowledge that can be used to benefit him or herself, labeling such a 
practice as “reasonable paternalism.”115 She draws a distinction between 
preventing harm and creating benefit, arguing that knowing one’s genetic 
status offers the possibility of a benefit, but not knowing about a genetic 
defect does not directly harm the person, since the defect is present 
regardless.116 If forced provision of information poses a risk of harm, and 
there is only a possibility of creating benefit (rather than prevention of 
harm) unwanted provision of genetic information is indefensibly 
paternalistic.117 According to her view, it is paternalistic to overrule 
individual choice, even if a choice differs from our conception of what is 
“reasonable.”118 This paternalism may be understandable, but that does not 
make it acceptable.119  
Roberto Andorno also argues that individuals may have a legitimate 
interest in not knowing their genetic makeup in order to avoid serious 
psychological consequences.120 Not only does he endorse the commonsense 
view that it is respectful of autonomy to comply with an individual’s stated 
preference, he goes further to say that honoring the RNTK should be seen 
as an enhancement of an individual’s autonomy “because the decision to 
know or not to know is not taken out of the hands of the patient by the 
doctor.”121 Furthermore, he makes a non-maleficence argument, claiming 
that if the information is likely to cause psychological harm, the medical 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 490 (explaining that “reasonable paternalism” essentially disregards individual 
autonomy for a more objective standard that looks solely to “what a reasonable person would do” 
in similar circumstances). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Takala, supra note 113, at 490 (finding that individual autonomy should be insulated from 
societal judgment and paternalistic limitations guided by the objectivity of “what a reasonable 
person would do”). 
 119. Takala, supra note 105, at 288 (arguing that “liberal societies should acknowledge 
people’s right to remain in ignorance” unless “grave harm would follow if people were allowed to 
make these self-regarding decisions”). 
 120. Andorno, supra note 28, at 435–37. 
 121. Id. at 436. 
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principle of primum non nocere (do no harm) justifies honoring the 
RNTK.122 
Others make an argument based on scientific uncertainty, pointing out 
that genetic information is often less probative than people realize.123 
Indeed, there are many conditions where genetics simply reveal a risk 
factor, rather than anything of diagnostic certainty.124 In some cases “since 
being a carrier is not something that can be averted by informing, it is not 
clear why there should be an onus on individuals to know, or to facilitate 
others being told, about their genetic constitution.”125 These authors also 
highlight how reproductive issues give genetic information a unique 
valence, as genetic knowledge may present a constraint on autonomous 
reproductive choices if people change their decisions due to the genetic 
information.126  
Interestingly, there does not seem to be overwhelming support in the 
foundational RNTK literature for a strict, autonomy-based RNTK.127 The 
limited number of scholars discussed above support such a view, but the 
weight of the literature is squarely against an expansive view of the RNTK. 
As I will discuss in the next few sections, most scholars either argue for a 
much narrower conception of the RNTK, or dismiss the idea entirely. 
B. The Arguments Against a Strong RNTK 
1. Autonomy Misapplied 
There are a number of lines of reasoning challenging the notion of a 
strong, autonomy-based RNTK. One main strain of criticism asserts that the 
concept of an autonomy-based RNTK is too broad and that the principle has 
been misapplied.128 As Rhodes has argued, “Misunderstandings about the 
nature and moral force of autonomy have led some in the genetics 
 
 122. Id. at 437. 
 123. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 22, at 252 (“Because of the varied causal nature of many 
‘genetic’ diseases or conditions, it seems highly unlikely that any one test or series of tests would 
be able to incorporate the numerous factors that influence the development of the illness.”). 
 124. See id. at 251–52. 
 125. Jane Wilson, To Know or Not to Know? Genetic Ignorance, Autonomy and Paternalism, 
19 BIOETHICS 492, 502 (2005). 
 126. See id. at 498; supra Part III.A. 
 127. I’m defining the foundational literature as the articles published prior to the emergence of 
genomic sequencing technology in approximately 2007. Compare Andorno, supra note 28, at 435 
(arguing that the RNTK genetic information is deeply grounded in the theoretical concept of 
autonomy); with Laurie, Privacy in an Uncertain World, supra note 105, at 190 (advocating that 
the foundational basis for the RNTK is grounded in privacy as opposed to autonomy). 
 128. See Wilson, supra note 125, at 502. 
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community to a false conclusion about genetic ignorance.”129 The concern 
with an autonomy-based RNTK stems from the commonly held view that 
rights are “pre-emptive and value-laden” and therefore the content of a right 
must be carefully articulated and defended.130  
On Laurie’s account, autonomy fails as a basis for doing so for a 
number of reasons.131 First, a strong, autonomy-based RNTK is 
inappropriate because that line of reasoning unrealistically requires ignoring 
the fact that there is no such thing as an unfettered choice.132 There are lots 
of things that people would like to do (or not do), or to know (or not know), 
but one sometimes must make non-ideal choices. Second, there is no basis 
for the idea that information alone is autonomy-constraining, because a 
clear distinction can be drawn between obtaining relevant information and 
making subsequent decisions on the basis of that information.133 Finally, 
autonomy is not boundless; there are certain actions that are prohibited as a 
matter of public policy, like suicide or selling oneself into slavery.134 
Instead of autonomy, Laurie argues in favor of a RNTK grounded in 
privacy.135 Distinguishing his reasoning from the more common autonomy 
claims, he states that the RNTK is “better characterized as a privacy issue 
that is related to, and yet distinct from, autonomy claims that we each might 
have as individuals worthy of respect.”136 He prefers the principle of 
privacy because it provides a “neutral basis from which arguments about 
the merits and demerits of non-disclosure can be advanced and 
assessed.”137 He builds his theory on the idea of spatial privacy, or the 
notion that we have a right to ensure that an individual is in “in a state of 
non-access.”138 Spatial privacy includes both the familiar notion of physical 
separateness, but also “encompasses separateness of the individual’s 
psyche.”139 The latter form of privacy entitles an individual to protect his or 
 
 129. Rhodes, supra note 105, at 26. See also Matti Häyry & Tuija Takala, Genetic Information, 
Rights, and Autonomy, 22 THEORETICAL MED. BIOETHICS 403, 403 (2001). 
 130. See Graeme Laurie, Recognizing the Right Not to Know: Conceptual, Professional, and 
Legal Implications, 42 J.L. MED. ETHICS 53, 56 (2014) (rejecting the characterization of non-
knowledge as a “right”). 
 131. See id. at 55–56. 
 132. See id. at 56 (“no choice in life is unfettered by circumstantial influence . . . ”); see also 
John Harris & Kirsty Keywood, Ignorance, Information and Autonomy, 22 THEORETICAL MED. 
BIOETHICS 415, 418 (2001) (stating that all choices have an effect on autonomy to some extent). 
 133. Laurie, supra note 130, at 56. 
 134. Harris & Keywood, supra note 132, at 420. 
 135. Laurie, supra note 130, at 53. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 56. 
 138. See Laurie, In Defence of Ignorance, supra note 105, at 119 (explaining that this right is 
violated when one’s physical sphere is invaded). 
 139. Id. 
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her own sense of self.140 As a result, it can be an invasion of one’s 
“psychological spatial privacy” to receive information about oneself that 
was not already possessed.141 
Ultimately, in basing his conception of a RNTK in privacy rather than 
autonomy, he calls into question the view that the RNTK is actually a 
strong right.142 Rather, he acknowledges that a decision to violate 
someone’s psychological privacy involves a number of competing factors 
and must be holistically assessed instead of being held up as a strict ethical 
rule.143 Using a privacy lens, Laurie demonstrates that an unwanted 
disclosure can be a violation, as it represents an incursion into the private 
sphere.144 But even if disclosure constitutes a violation of privacy, it can be 
justifiable under certain circumstances.145 Ultimately, he argues for a prima 
facie presumption in favor of non-violation of the sphere of privacy.146 This 
presumption can be rebutted, however, in a range of clinical cases.147 When 
considering the justifiability of violating someone’s psychological integrity, 
a number of factors should be relevant, including: availability of a cure or 
intervention, severity of the condition, and the likelihood of disease 
manifestation.148 
Wilson, like Laurie, is a RNTK proponent who does not see autonomy 
as the correct supporting principle.149 She acknowledges that it is possible 
to view the provision of genetic information as an attack on autonomy, 
particularly when such information “impinges on the range of choices that 
an individual has to make, and on the conditions of autonomy required to 
make them.”150 However, she thinks that a RNTK should exist in a much 
more limited form than an autonomy-based view would require.151 While 
she concedes that there should be a RNTK in certain obvious circumstances 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. at 119–20. 
 142. See id. at 123–24, 127, 129 (suggesting that autonomy cannot explain the RNTK because 
there is simply no way to exercise the choice of not knowing, while privacy, on the other hand, 
suggests the idea that individuals can be protected from unwarranted information about 
themselves). 
 143. Id. at 127 
 144. See Laurie, In Defence of Ignorance, supra note 105, at 124 (explaining that sharing 
unwanted information diminishes the amount of control that one has over their own private 
sphere, as it coerces an individual into self-reflection and re-evaluation). 
 145. See id. at 121 (arguing that in order for an action to be justifiable, there must be a high 
likelihood that the harm will be avoided by the revelation of the information). 
 146. Id. at 127. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 127–28. 
 149. Wilson, supra note 125, at 503–04. 
 150. Id. at 502. 
 151. See id. at 503–04 (arguing that greater consideration should be given to potential harms 
and benefits to welfare). 
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(such as when there is nothing that can be done with the information, or 
there is clear evidence of psychological harm that will result) her primary 
claim is that an autonomy-based RNTK is unjustifiably broad, and that we 
should only be talking about a narrow RNTK in limited situations when it 
can be justified by a clear demonstration that welfare costs to an individual 
outweigh associated benefits.152 
Räikkä similarly explores whether autonomy is the correct theoretical 
grounding for a RNTK, arguing that while self-determination can 
technically support a RNTK to know, such a position relies on a number of 
problematic assumptions.153 In particular, he is concerned about our ability 
to determine when people are making competent, authentic decisions and 
whether one can ever make a solely self-regarding choice to refuse genetic 
information.154 Given the controversies inherent in asserting an autonomy-
based RNTK, he worries about its persuasive rigor when appealed to in 
concrete cases where the RNTK is in question.155 He argues that when:  
there are disagreements about whether a person has a right to 
know or a right not to know, it may be unhelpful to refer to a 
right to personal determination. To argue for example that a 
person has a right not to have information concerning her own 
genes, since she has a moral right to self-determination, is 
nowhere near enough to convince and give a rational warrant to 
believe she has such a right.156   
Ultimately, he concludes that proponents of controversial claims, like the 
RNTK, should avoid appealing to autonomy and instead find “values that 
allow for a shorter, less controversial route to shedding light on the 
problem.”157 
Given the views of scholars like Laurie, Wilson, and Räikkä, there is 
clearly a school of thought comprised of people who generally accept a 
form of the RNTK, but who reject a broad, autonomy-based view. 
Interestingly, these scholars are clear that we should anticipate the 
circumstances where the RNTK can be overridden.158 For example, Laurie 
 
 152. Id. at 499–500, 502–04 (arguing for an alternative to an autonomy-based RNTK, which 
considers harms and values to welfare, and whether disclosure of the information will be useful in 
light of the specifics of the genetic disease). 
 153. Räikkä, supra note 105, at 61, 62. 
 154. Id. at 62. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. at 63. 
 158. See, e.g., Herring & Foster, supra note 109, at 28. (“We do not say that this is or should 
be an absolute right. We accept that, like most other recognized rights, it can and sometimes 
should be outweighed by other considerations.”); Räikkä, supra note 105, at 57 (“If a person has a 
weak right to self-determination, there are cases in which it is justified to override the right to self-
determination . . . . In a given situation we should always first consider the circumstances and only 
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argues that the RNTK should be balanced against a number of clinical 
considerations, including the availability of a treatment for a severe disease 
that is likely to manifest.159 Herring and Foster agree that there should be 
exceptions to any RNTK, presenting criteria similar to those endorsed by 
Laurie.160 These exceptions echo the idea that I will defend in more detail 
in the sections below, namely that we should reject a RNTK that is so broad 
as to include conditions where medical action can mitigate or prevent 
mortality or serious morbidity, and where there is strong evidence of the 
link between genotype and significant disease risk. 
2. The Incoherence Objection 
In addition to challenging the notion that the principle of autonomy 
plausibly supports a RNTK, some critics make an even more forceful 
argument, calling into question the very coherence of the RNTK as a viable 
concept. These scholars make an autonomy claim of their own, but in the 
opposite direction, advancing the idea that knowledge is necessary in order 
to exercise autonomy.161 One needs to know that there is a question in order 
to make a decision; so not knowing undermines one’s ability to make an 
 
then decide whether a right to self-determination should be respected.”); Andorno, supra note 28, 
at 437 (arguing that it is appropriate to consider overriding the RNTK if there is serious risk to 
other individuals; if there are reasonable and effective treatments/cures for the condition being 
tested for; or for broader public health reasons).  
 159. Laurie, supra note 130, at 59 (listing a number of other relevant considerations: “The 
availability of a cure or effective intervention; the severity of the condition and likelihood of 
onset; the nature of the health condition itself, e.g., genetic or otherwise; the nature of any further 
testing or intervention that might be required; the nature of the information to be disclosed; the 
nature of the request (e.g., testing for an individual’s health or for diagnostic purposes for a 
relative); the question of whether and how far disclosure can further a legitimate public interest, 
which can include familial interests; and the question of how the individual might react if offered 
unsolicited information (e.g., whether any advance decision has been made and is applicable in the 
circumstances).”). 
 160. Herring & Foster, supra note 109, at 27 (listing: “The availability of cures or preventive 
measures[;]The severity of the disease and likelihood of onset; The nature of the disorder[;] The 
availability of genetic testing and its accuracy in assessing the risk[;] The relative’s likely 
emotional reaction when given the information[;] The effect any decision (to disclose or not to 
disclose) will have on the familial relationship and on the dynamics of the particular family.”). 
 161. See, e.g., Phillipa Malpas, The Right to Remain in Ignorance About Genetic Information–
Can Such a Right Be Defended in the Name of Autonomy?, 118 N. ZEALAND MED. J. 71, 72 
(2005) (“Respecting self-determination requires that individuals have access to information so that 
they can make informed decisions.”); Laurie, supra note 130, at 55 (“[I]n order for us to choose 
meaningfully, we must be informed about the parameters within which we are being invited to 
exercise choice. The entire consent mechanism is constructed around informed choice.”); Rhodes, 
supra note 105, at 17 (“[R]espect for autonomy actually leads to the opposite conclusion, the 
obligation to pursue genetic knowledge.”). 
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autonomous choice.162 Rather, autonomy demands “critical reflection,” 
which includes thoughtful, informed decision-making, and deliberation.163 
This is made impossible if one deprives one’s self of information.164 
Without relevant information, it is impossible to make informed decisions 
about future plans, and ill-informed decisions may even frustrate one’s 
future self, as an individual may make choices that are ultimately self-
defeating.165 As one scholar argued, a refusal of relevant knowledge is so 
irrational as to be “directly opposed to human rights philosophy and to 
ethics.”166 
Some have gone as far as saying that autonomy requires rationality, 
and freedom of will, but patients who deny themselves readily available 
information are not acting rationally, as they are depriving themselves of 
relevant health information.167 If someone is so fixed in their intentions that 
no amount of relevant information would change their mind, this would be 
tantamount to an irrational obsession.168 Similarly, it is logically impossible 
for someone to claim to know a priori that information will not be relevant 
to his or her decision.169  
This line of reasoning not only rejects a RNTK, but also seems to 
imply a moral duty to be informed about information that would make a 
difference in decisions (at least when it can be obtained without undue 
effort).170 For example, Rhodes argues that the concept of autonomy may 
actually create a duty to know, as people cannot make autonomous choices 
without relevant information.171 Therefore, rather than respecting 
autonomy, the RNTK allows willful blindness that stymies autonomous 
decision-making.172 This duty to know is activated when “genetic 
 
 162. See, e.g., Veatch, supra note 104, at 26–33 (“If the human is ethically responsible for 
decisions about his or her own medical future, it can be seriously questioned at the ethical level 
whether one is justified in waiving information necessary to make a consent informed.”).  
 163. Malpas, supra note 161, at 75 (“When autonomy (as self-determination) is understood as 
involving critical self-reflection, deliberation, and thoughtful and informed decision-making, it 
becomes clear that one must have relevant information at ones [sic] disposal to be autonomous.”). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Gilbert Hottois, A Philosophical and Critical Analysis of the European Convention of 
Bioethics, 25 J. MED. & PHILOS. 133, 140 (2000). 
 167. Ost, supra note 27, at 306.  
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. (“But to claim to know what you cannot know is contradictory, i.e., irrational.”) 
 170. Id. at 309 (“[W]e can say that the right of informed consent is a mandatory right, and that 
receiving information about one’s diagnosis, alternative treatments, etc., is both a right and a 
duty.”). See also Rhodes, supra note 105, at 18. 
 171. Rhodes, supra note 105, at 18. 
 172. Harris & Keywood, supra note 132, at 418 (2001) (arguing that the right not to know is 
“inimical to liberty rights”). 
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information is likely to make a significant difference in my decisions and 
when the relevant information is obtainable with reasonable effort.”173  
If there is no such thing as a right to remain ignorant of true genetic 
information about oneself, the RNTK must compete on equal terms with 
others’ rights. Harris and Keywood propose two rights in particular, that 
might reasonably defeat a desire to remain in ignorance.174 First, they 
present an argument for the right of free speech, particularly in the context 
of doctors exercising their free speech right to warn patients about medical 
risks, and to provide patients with a fully informed understanding of their 
health conditions.175 Second, they argue for the right to decline to accept 
responsibility for others’ decisions; doctors should not be forced to make 
certain decisions for patients who are willfully ignorant of their true health 
status.176 I will explore these and other possible relevant considerations in 
Section V below. 
3. Effects on Third Parties  
A third objection to a strict, autonomy-based RNTK is founded on a 
concern about the effect of maintaining one’s ignorance on others. On this 
line of reasoning, genetic information unavoidably involves relatives, and 
one has an obligation to learn readily available information about your 
health in order to allow relatives to have an opportunity to act on that 
knowledge.177 Relatives that hadn’t previously known about a familial 
genetic risk would be able to benefit from knowing by taking a variety of 
actions, such as seeking their own genetic testing, changing risk-associated 
behaviors, pursuing prophylactic treatment options, engaging in rigorous 
screening, etc.178  
Austad articulates this kind of view clearly, arguing that the RNTK 
does not actually rise to the level of a human right because genetic 
information does not only implicate a single individual.179 Rather, genetic 
information, and information about genetic risks, implicates the individual, 
their family members, their practicing physician, and, potentially, scientific 
research into genetics in general.180 An individual’s desire to say no to 
genetic information may conflict with the duty of care (i.e., duty to warn) a 
 
 173. Rhodes, supra note 105, at 18. 
 174. Harris and Keywood, supra note 132, at 418. 
 175. Id. at 431. 
 176. Id. at 431–32. 
 177. See Austad, supra note 105, at 87. 
 178. See, e.g., id.; Maria C. Bottis, Comment on a View Favoring Ignorance of Genetic 
Information: Confidentiality, Autonomy, Beneficence and the Right Not to Know, 7 EUR. J. 
HEALTH L. 173, 174, 179–80 (2000). 
 179. Austad, supra note 105, at 87. 
 180. Id. 
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potentially affected family member.181 This does not mean that the RNTK 
should not be respected if possible, but that there are clear situations where 
other competing ethical principles might cause one to disregard a desired 
RNTK.182 On this view, the RNTK should not be viewed as a strict right183 
and when there is a conflict between the RNTK and the right of relatives to 
sensitive genetic information concerning their own health, the RNTK must 
yield, due to the very real risk of harm to the family members.184 Andorno 
advances a similar, but somewhat weaker claim, calling the RNTK a 
“relative right, in the sense that it may be restricted when disclosure to the 
individual is necessary in order to avoid serious harm to third parties, 
especially family members.”185 
4. Outdated Examples 
Thus far, I have shown that the foundational RNTK literature 
substantially challenges the notion of a strong, autonomy-based right. Even 
if one finds the critiques presented above to be unconvincing, there is an 
additional, novel argument to be made against those asserting a strong 
RNTK. Specifically, the examples used by scholars to support a RNTK are 
extremely limited and, I would argue, have not kept pace with evolution of 
genomic technologies. A close reading of the literature demonstrates an 
almost exclusive reliance on three primary examples: Huntington’s disease 
(“HD”), Alzheimer’s disease (“AD”), and breast cancer (“BRCA”). 186  
Starting with HD and AD, defenders of RNTK often point to concerns 
about testing for these two conditions, citing data on people’s reluctance to 
get tested.187 Similarly, the illustrative cases are typically about one of 
 
 181. Id. (“If somebody objects to being informed and prevents relatives from being informed, 
this person is rejecting his/her duty to inform those who may really want this information and may 
also need it.”) 
 182. See id. (noting conflicts between individuals who may not want to know and relatives 
who would prefer to have that information). 
 183. Id. at 88 (“[T]he right not to know is not to be considered as an absolute ethical principle, 
especially when dealing with very sensitive genetic information.”) 
 184. Id. (“If somebody objects to being informed and prevents relatives from being informed, 
this person is rejecting his/her duty to inform those who may really want this information and may 
also need it.”) 
 185. Andorno, supra note 28, at 439. 
 186. See e.g., id., at 435; Bredenoord, supra note 72, at 29. 
 187. See, e.g., Tarja-Brita Robins Wahlin, To Know or Not to Know: A Review of Behavioral 
and Suicidal Ideation in Pre-Clinical Huntington’s Disease, 65 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 
279, 281–82 (2007) (noting that several recent studies indicated that 3 to 21 percent of at-risk 
persons enter predictive testing programs; a vast majority feared the negative consequences of a 
potential positive result). 
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these three examples.188 RNTK proponents cite these kinds of studies and 
cases to illustrate the potential anxiety that people feel when faced with 
negative genetic information, and to support the claim that there is a very 
real risk of harm associated with unwanted provision of one’s genetic 
status.189 
But both examples come out of the targeted genetics era, and I would 
argue that they have limited utility as valid comparators in the modern 
genomic era. HD and AD are devastating and presently immitigable 
neurological conditions.190 As such they are sui generis, since they present 
the possibility of psychological harm without any corresponding clinical 
benefit.191  
When these kinds of examples are utilized by scholars, they should 
only be used to make a claim about the RNTK genetic information 
associated with commensurate diseases. But this isn’t the case; 
commentators consistently use these limited examples to make broader 
claims. For example, Andorno appropriately starts by arguing that “for 
many people, the discovery that they have a genetic condition that places 
them at a high risk of suffering certain untreatable diseases could so 
depress them that the quality, joy, and purpose of their lives would literally 
evaporate” (emphasis added).192 But this qualification that the RNTK only 
applies in this subset of conditions falls away thereafter and most other 
authors don’t even follow Andorno’s initial token wave at this important 
limitation.193  
The field of genomic medicine has moved beyond these two limited 
examples; the current iteration of the RNTK debate should really be about 
whether individuals have the right to refuse information regarding 
conditions where medical action can mitigate or prevent mortality or 
 
 188. See, e.g., Andorno, supra note 28, at 435 (citing examples of individuals with a genetic 
predisposition to Alzheimer’s and breast cancer); Bredenoord et al., supra note 72, at 29 
(providing research on breast cancer testing in at-risk patients). 
 189. See, e.g., Andorno, supra note 28, at 435 (presenting examples of situations where at-risk 
patients reject genetic testing for fear of negative consequences); Bredenoord et al., supra note 72, 
at 29 (noting that a high percentage of people refuse genetic testing to avoid psychological harm); 
Austad, supra note 105, at 86 (stating that the RNTK is motivated by the psychological pressures 
that individuals may face). 
 190. See Wahlin, supra note 187, at 279 (“HD is an autosomal dominant neurodegenerative 
disorder characterized by irreversible physical and mental deterioration, personality change, and 
increased susceptibility to mental disorder.”); What is Alzheimer’s?, ALZ.ORG, 
http://www.alz.org/alzheimers_disease_what_is_alzheimers.asp (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) 
(noting that AD is the sixth-leading cause of death in the United States and has no cure). 
 191. See Wahlin, supra note 187, at 280 (noting that because there is no cure or adequate 
treatment for HD, there may be no legitimate benefit in predictive testing; instead, the 
psychological risk associated may result in injury to the patient). 
 192. Andorno, supra note 28, at 435. 
 193. Id. 
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serious morbidity, and where there is strong evidence of the link between 
genotype and significant disease risk. Citing to evidence of concern about 
being tested for HD or AD is irrelevant to this important debate, since the 
real empirical and normative questions relate to whether people would or 
should refuse to learn about potentially life-saving genetic information.  
BRCA is a somewhat harder case. BRCA testing does offer clinical 
benefit, but it was commonly used to illustrate why we needed a RNTK 
because of concerns about stigma and discrimination.194 Although it would 
be an exaggeration to claim that these worries have completely dissipated, 
our society seems to be moving away from worries about psychosocial 
harms associated with BRCA. Rather, we seem to moving towards the view 
that BRCA testing might offer positive public health benefits, so much so 
that Dr. Mary-Claire King has argued for population level screening.195 Dr. 
King dismissed concerns about psychosocial harms of knowing one’s 
BRCA status, arguing that “women do not benefit by practices that ‘protect’ 
them from information regarding their own health.”196  
**** 
In this section, I have taken a close look at the philosophical origins of 
the RNTK. Contrary to what contemporary commentators have been 
arguing, the notion of a strong, autonomy-based RNTK rests on an unstable 
conceptual foundation. Only a handful of philosophers have endorsed such 
a position, with the majority either arguing for a much more limited, non-
autonomy-based conception, or even against the whole concept entirely. In 
the next section, I address another commonly advanced (but poorly 
defended) argument in favor of a strong RNTK: that the legal right to refuse 
medical treatment includes a right to refuse medical information. 
  
 
 194. See Bredenoord, supra note 72, at 29 (referencing research that supports the notion that a 
large percentage of people refuse genetic testing for the BRCA gene for fear of discrimination). 
 195. Mary Claire King et al., Population-Based Screening for BRCA1 and BRCA2, 312 JAMA 
1091 (2014), available at http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=1902783. 
 196. Id. at 1092. 
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IV.  IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED  
RIGHT NOT TO KNOW? 
When thinking about legal rights in the medical realm, courts must 
often confront a difficult conflict between autonomy and beneficence. The 
principle of autonomy demands that an individual gets to control one’s own 
body according to one’s own preferences and desires, free from imposition 
by other people or institutions.197 The principle of beneficence, on the other 
hand, is only concerned with achieving what is best for a person, both by 
avoiding harm and by doing positive good.198 These principles can come 
into tension when a person does not want something that others would 
reasonably perceive to be in an individual’s best interest (or the interests of 
third parties).199 
Courts have struggled with this tension in end-of-life cases as medical 
technology has advanced, expanding the ways in which doctors can help 
people by creating new, but often invasive, methods for extending life.200 A 
number of commentators have drawn a direct link between the well-
established legal right to refuse medical treatments and the RNTK genetic 
information about oneself.201 Either directly or implicitly, these scholars 
seem to be asserting that a patient’s constitutionally protected autonomous 
right to place limits on the medical interventions to which they are 
subjected also includes the ability to broadly limit the medical information 
to which they are exposed.202 As one group of prominent bioethics scholars 
put it:  
 
 197. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 
57–58 (5th ed. 2001). 
 198. Id. at 166. 
 199. See id. at 176 (noting that proponents of benevolence believe a “physician’s primary 
obligation is to act for the patient’s medical benefit, not to encourage autonomous decision-
making.”). 
 200. See id. at 142–43 (noting that “legal liability should not be imposed on physicians and 
surrogates unless they have an obligation to provide or continue the treatment.”); see also id. at 
176–86 (noting that the role of paternalism persists in the government sector when medical 
advances are involved). See generally Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1986) (holding that a patient had the right to remove a nasogastric tube that had been 
inserted against her will). 
 201. See, e.g., Burke et al., supra note 72, at 856–57 (noting that patients decline gene analysis 
for a number of reasons, including limited evidence on test performance and outcomes); Lázaro-
Muñoz et al., supra note 72, at 4 (stating that individuals have the right to control the medical test 
performed, rooted in a right to bodily autonomy); Wolf et al., Patient Autonomy, supra note 72, at 
1049–50 (stating that patients have the right to refuse testing and findings, even if potentially 
lifesaving). 
 202. See Wolf et al., Patient Autonomy, supra note 72, at 1050 (explaining that medical 
information should not be imposed upon patients since they have the right to refuse medical 
testing and findings); see also Burke et al., supra note 72, at 856–57 (explaining that adult patients 
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Competent adult patients have an established right to refuse 
medical interventions recommended by their health-care 
providers. This right is present even when medical interventions 
are immediately life-saving . . . . Unless patients’ decision-
making capacity is impaired . . . their right to refuse is virtually 
unlimited. The ACMG recommendations propose, however, that 
any patient accepting WES/WGS [whole genome sequencing] for 
a clinical indication must also accept analysis of the 56 
genes . . . .203 
None of these authors have actually engaged in a rigorous legal 
analysis of this claim. I do so below, concluding that the right to refuse 
medical treatment cannot easily be expanded to include a right to refuse 
medical information.  
A. The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment 
The right to refuse medical treatment can primarily trace its roots to 
common-law informed consent jurisprudence204 and Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process liberty interests.205 Building on these 
areas of law, courts have found a constitutionally protected privacy interest 
in refusing medical treatment.206 This right has been firmly based on views 
 
have an unlimited right to refuse doctor-recommended treatment and undergo further analysis of 
their health conditions). 
 203. See Burke et al., supra note 72, at 856–57; see also Lázaro-Muñoz et al., supra note 72, at 
11 (“Informed consent implies that the individual must freely consent in advance to medical 
intervention; its negative logical corollary is that the individual is free to refuse. It is widely 
recognized that the doctrine of informed consent applies to medical examinations; thus, clinicians 
routinely obtain [them] before ordering genetic tests. The application of the informed consent 
doctrine to genetic testing implies that individuals have a legal right to refuse genetic tests.”) 
(citation omitted); see Wolf et al., Patient Autonomy, supra note 72, at 1049 (“Informed consent is 
a well-established legal requirement designed to protect patient autonomy–not a matter susceptible 
to modification by experts in human genetics, no matter how learned. Circumstances in which 
clinicians can test without consent are rare exceptions . . . . However, this does not apply when 
laboratories and clinicians perform clinical sequencing, because they are not responding to a 
medical emergency threatening imminent harm and preventing them from seeking consent.”).  
 204. See, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1890) (“No right is held 
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual 
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, 
unless by clear and unquestioning authority of the law.”); Schloendorff v. Soc’y of New York 
Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a 
right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an 
operation without the patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”); In 
re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1040 (Miss. 1985) (“The informed consent rule rests upon the 
bedrock of this state’s respect for the individual’s right to be free of unwanted bodily intrusions no 
matter how well intentioned.”). 
 205. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing the Constitutional right to 
privacy). 
 206. See Brown, 478 So.2d at 1040 (stating that Mississippi’s Chancery Court could not 
compel a woman to receive a blood transfusion after she refused one); see also In re Quinlan, 355 
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about the sanctity of bodily integrity.207 As I will argue, bodily integrity is 
clearly distinct from psychological integrity, therefore undermining the 
claim that the right to refuse medical treatment also includes the RNTK.  
One of the earliest prominent end-of-life cases was that of Karen 
Quinlan.208 Ms. Quinlan was admitted to the hospital after she became 
unconscious and ceased breathing for an extended period.209 Though stable, 
she had experienced significant brain damage and was diagnosed as being 
in a persistent vegetative state.210 As her condition deteriorated, she 
eventually required artificial respiration and nasogastric feeding to 
survive.211 With no prospect for improvement, her father petitioned the 
court to remove the ventilator.212 His petition was opposed by a number of 
parties, including Ms. Quinlan’s doctors, the hospital, and the State of New 
Jersey.213 After lower courts initially denied the family’s request, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court eventually found in their favor.214 They held that Ms. 
Quinlan had a constitutionally protected right to privacy that would have 
permitted her to refuse medical treatment if competent, and that allowed her 
family to act as her surrogate since she was not competent.215  
In finding an individual right to privacy, the court extensively relied on 
the notion of bodily integrity. They argued that the State’s interest in 
preserving life “weakens and the individual’s right to privacy grows as the 
degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims.” 216 In many 
cases, the importance of an individual’s right to bodily integrity can 
supersede the State’s interest in preserving life.217  
The Quinlan case was widely followed,218 but ultimately the Supreme 
Court directly addressed the right to die in the case of Nancy Cruzan.219 
 
A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976) (explaining that the individual’s right to privacy against bodily invasion 
can overcome the state’s interest) 
 207. See S. Elizabeth Malloy, Beyond Misguided Paternalism: Resuscitating the Right to 
Refuse Medical Treatment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1035, 1048–49 (1998) (stating that the right 
to make medical decisions is established in the right to one’s own bodily integrity which is 
derived from informed consent). 
 208. Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647. 
 209. Id. at 653–54. 
 210. Id. at 654. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 651. 
 213. Id. at 650. 
 214. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 671 (holding that Quinlan’s father has “full power to make 
decisions” regarding his daughter’s medical treatment). 
 215. Id. at 665–66. 
 216. Id. at 664. 
 217. See id. (noting the strength of one’s right to privacy over a State’s own interests). 
 218. George J. Annas, “Culture of Life” Politics at the Bedside — The Case of Terri Schiavo, 
352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1710, 1711 (2005) (explaining that the Quinlan case encouraged states to 
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Cruzan was severely injured in a car accident.220 Although she was 
discovered without a heartbeat or respiration, paramedics were able to 
restore these functions, but she remained unconscious.221 It was estimated 
that her brain had been without oxygen for twelve to fourteen minutes, well 
beyond the six-minute window when permanent brain damage is thought to 
occur.222 Once it became clear that Cruzan would not recover, her parents 
asked the medical staff to terminate artificial nutrition and hydration.223 
The hospital refused, prompting Cruzan’s parents to seek authorization 
from the courts.224 After an initial ruling in favor of the parents at the trial 
court level, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed. Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.225  
Much of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion focused on 
explaining why the United States Constitution does not bar states from 
setting evidentiary requirements about an incompetent person’s desire to be 
withdrawn from life-sustaining treatments,226 which is beyond the scope of 
this article. What is relevant, however, was the justification for holding that 
competent individuals have a constitutionally protected liberty interest 
under the due process clause in refusing medical treatment.227 Like the 
Court in Quinlan, the Supreme Court relied extensively on the concept of 
bodily integrity. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reasoning built on informed 
consent jurisprudence, which was in turn based on common law ideas of 
battery (unwanted, offensive touching).228 He suggested that if bodily 
 
provide legal immunity to hospitals that feared they would be sued for following advanced 
directives of patients that later became incompetent). 
 219. Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).  
 220. Id. at 266. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 267. 
 224. Id. at 268. 
 225. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 268 (1990) (detailing the back and forth decisions by the Missouri 
court on the issue of informed consent). 
 226. Id. at 280 (explaining that the Constitution allows states to set evidentiary requirements 
and that whether a state’s requirements align with the law depends on the interest the state is 
seeking to protect. Additionally, a state should not have to remain neutral when an informed 
person voluntarily chooses to take actions that cause her death—for example, willful starvation.). 
 227. Id. at 278. 
 228. Id. at 277 (“As these cases demonstrate, the common law doctrine of informed consent is 
viewed as generally encompassing the right of a competent individual to refuse medical 
treatment.”); see also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (acknowledging that the 
requirement of a vaccine for certain individuals could be cruel and inhumane and thus an 
overreaching of government power); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251–52 
(1891) (holding “[n]o right is held more sacred or is more carefully guarded by the common law 
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from 
restraint or interference of others unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law”); 
Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.E. 92, 95 (N.Y. 1914) (holding “a surgeon who 
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integrity requires that one must give consent to receive medical treatment, it 
follows that patients also possess the right to refuse medical treatment.229 
Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion to further clarify why 
she believed that there is a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
refusing unwanted medical treatment.230 Echoing the majority opinion, she 
stressed the connection to bodily integrity.231 Even more than Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, however, she painted a picture of the physical imposition that 
life-sustaining treatment might entail: 
Whether or not the techniques used to pass food and water into 
the patient’s alimentary tract are termed “medical treatment,” it is 
clear they all involve some degree of intrusion and restraint. 
Feeding a patient by means of a nasogastric tube requires a 
physician to pass a long flexible tube through the patient’s nose, 
throat and esophagus and into the stomach. Because of the 
discomfort such a tube causes, “[m]any patients need to be 
restrained forcibly, and their hands put into large mittens to 
prevent them from removing the tube.” . . . Requiring a 
competent adult to endure such procedures against her will 
burdens the patient’s liberty, dignity, and freedom to determine 
the course of her own treatment. Accordingly, the liberty 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it protects 
anything, an individual’s deeply personal decision to reject 
medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and 
water.232 
Although the three dissenting justices did not agree with the ultimate 
holding of the Court, they joined in strongly asserting that there is a 
 
performs an operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault for which he is liable in 
damages”). 
 229. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270 (“The logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that 
the patient generally possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse treatment.”). Although the 
three dissenting justices did not agree with the ultimate holding of the Court because they assert 
that the right to refuse medical treatment is fundamental, their reasoning also clearly relies on 
one’s autonomous right to bodily integrity. See id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The right to 
be free from medical attention without consent, to determine what shall be done with one's own 
body, is deeply rooted in this Nation's traditions . . . .”). 
 230. See id. at 287 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 231. Id. at 287 (“[T]he liberty interest in refusing medical treatment flows from decisions 
involving the State’s invasions into the body. Because our notions of liberty are inextricably 
entwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-determination, the Court has often deemed 
state incursions into the body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process Clause.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 232. Id. at 288–89. 
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fundamental right to refuse medical treatment, flowing from one’s 
autonomous right to bodily integrity.233  
These cases involved adults who lacked capacity to make decisions 
themselves, but similar language is found in cases where competent patients 
refused life-saving medical treatment. For example, in Bouvia v. Superior 
Court, the court affirmed the petitioner’s right to remove a nasogastric tube 
that had been inserted over her objections for the purpose of providing life-
sustaining nutrition.234 Ms. Bouvia was a college educated twenty-eight-
year-old woman with severe cerebral palsy and quadriplegia.235 Because of 
her deteriorating condition and quality of life, she repeatedly expressed a 
desire to die, and intended to refuse food to accomplish that aim.236 
Concerned about her weight loss, the medical staff began forced feedings, 
prompting Ms. Bouvia to petition the court to intervene.237 The court found 
that she did have a right to refuse medical treatment, using language clearly 
focused on her right to bodily integrity like that seen in Quinlan and 
Cruzan.238  
Taken together, these and related cases clearly demonstrate that the 
right to refuse medical treatment is specifically rooted in the idea of an 
individual’s autonomous right to bodily integrity.239 This makes sense 
given the strong history and legal tradition of protecting people against 
physical invasion.240 In contrast, RNTK cases would raise questions about 
the distinct concept of psychological integrity.241  As I will illustrate in the 
next section, there are a number of domains where courts have been willing 
to forcibly impose sensitive medical information on individuals, suggesting 
that courts would have difficulty finding a comparable history and tradition 
of protecting psychological integrity. 
 
 233. See id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The right to be free from medical attention 
without consent, to determine what shall be done with one's own body, is deeply rooted in this 
Nation's traditions . . . .”). 
 234. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
 235. Id. at 1135–36. 
 236. Id. at 1136. 
 237. Id. at 1136–37. 
 238. Id. at 1137 (“A person of adult years and in sound mind has the right, in the exercise of 
control over his own body, to determine whether or not to submit to lawful medical treatment.”). 
 239. For an extensive list of similar cases, see RONALD B. STANDLER, LEGAL RIGHT TO 
REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT IN THE USA at 33–39 (2012), http://www.rbs2.com/rrmt.pdf. 
 240. Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 YALE L.J. 1123, 1125 (1997). 
 241. See Laurie, supra note 130, at 58 (explaining psychological integrity as the non-
connectedness with others, including “being in a state of ignorance about one’s own health”). 
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B. Judicial Imposition of Medical Information 
There are a number of prominent areas of law that can be used to 
demonstrate the fact that the American judiciary has historically been quite 
willing to impose sensitive health information on individuals who might 
reasonably prefer not to know that information. While these cases are not 
directly about the RNTK, taken together this jurisprudence strongly 
suggests that courts would not be sympathetic to an argument that there is a 
clear history and legal tradition of honoring the RNTK in the United States. 
1. Mandatory Disclosure of Information to Women Seeking an 
Abortion  
Over the past two decades, opponents of abortion rights have 
advocated for a series of state laws requiring women seeking abortions to 
be given various kinds of medical information.242 Many of these disclosure 
laws are generic, in the sense that they require physicians to relay standard 
information relating to pregnancy, and the purported risks (physical and 
psychological) of seeking an abortion.243 However, there have also been a 
series of laws requiring women to be given specific information about their 
fetus, including gestational age, and the (scientifically contested) fact that 
an early fetus can feel pain.244 These mandatory disclosure laws are 
generally seen as creating a barrier to abortion; in a sense, the state is 
imposing potentially unwanted sensitive medical information on a woman 
for the purpose of dissuading her from continuing with the abortion.245 
Without delving too far into the contentious realm of abortion politics, I 
will show that partial judicial acceptance of these laws suggests that there 
are at least some cases where state interest in preserving life has been used 
to justify the forced imposition of unwanted medical information by the 
state. 
This trend began with Planned Parenthood v. Casey.246 The law at 
issue in Casey required, among other provisions, that doctors provide 
women with certain information beyond that which would have been 
required under standard informed consent jurisprudence.247 The Court in 
 
 242. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: COUNSELING AND WAITING PERIODS 
FOR ABORTION, http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf (last updated Nov. 
1, 2015). 
 243. See id. (describing various states laws requiring women to hear general information about 
their pregnancy including risks of an abortion or counseling for receiving an abortion); Erin 
Bernstein, The Upside of Abortion Disclosure Laws, 24 STANFORD L. & POL’Y REV. 171, 174 
(2013). 
 244. GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 242. 
 245. Bernstein, supra note 243, at 174. 
 246. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 247. Id. at 844.  
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Casey concluded that provisions entailing truthful, non-misleading 
information relevant to the decision of whether or not to go through with 
the abortion did not impose an undue burden on the woman seeking an 
abortion.248 They argued that although all pre-viability regulations burden a 
woman’s ability to obtain an abortion to some degree, an abortion law is not 
rendered unconstitutional just because it may make getting an abortion 
more difficult or more expensive, as long as the burden isn’t too 
substantial.249 Subsequent laws have expanded disclosure requirements, 
requiring doctors to provide scientifically questionable information, not to 
enhance informed consent, but to advance the state’s interest in preserving 
life or mitigating abortion’s negative effects.250 
In the past two decades, these abortion laws have begun to evolve and 
expand, recently adding provisions that require women to receive and view 
ultrasound images251 and hear the fetal heartbeat,252 even if they would 
prefer otherwise. Since they have been the most controversial, I will focus 
on mandatory ultrasound laws. As of 2015, three states mandate that 
women seeking an abortion view an ultrasound image of the fetus.253 
Another ten states require the provider to perform the procedure and offer 
an opportunity for the women to see the image.254 An additional fourteen 
states require that women be given an opportunity to see an ultrasound 
image under certain circumstances.255 
These laws have been challenged, and the judicial response has been 
split. In Stuart v. Camnitz, the Fourth Circuit struck down a law requiring 
narration of ultrasounds.256 The law at issue was North Carolina’s 
 
 248. Id. at 882 (“If the information the State requires to be made available to the woman is 
truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be permissible.”). 
 249. Id. at 874 (“Numerous forms of state regulation might have the incidental effect of 
increasing the cost or decreasing the availability of medical care, whether for abortion or any other 
medical procedure. The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at 
the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure 
an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. Only where state regulation imposes an undue 
burden on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart 
of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”). 
 250. Bernstein, supra note 243, at 173. 
 251. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REQUIREMENTS FOR ULTRASOUND, 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf (last updated Oct. 1, 2015) (noting 
that twenty-five states currently have such provisions). 
 252. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662, 665 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(considering a South Dakota law on informed consent); Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 497 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (concluding that the physician should advise women how to obtain the services of 
ultrasound imaging and auscultation of the fetal heartbeat if she chooses to do so). 
 253. GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 251 (Louisiana, Texas, and Wisconsin). 
 254. Id. (Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, and Virginia). 
 255. Id. 
 256. 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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Woman’s Right to Know Act,257 which set forth a real-time viewing 
mandate requiring physicians to perform an ultrasound, display the image, 
and describe the fetus to a woman seeking an abortion.258 The law 
stipulated that the description must continue, even if the woman turns away 
or otherwise attempts to avoid hearing what the doctor is saying.259 
Providers brought suit, arguing that this violated their free speech rights.260 
The court struck down the law under the First Amendment, holding that it 
was impermissible compelled speech because it “is ideological in intent and 
in kind.”261  
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has ruled that a similar law does not 
violate providers’ First Amendment rights.262 Like Stuart, the law in this 
case compelled doctors to take and display sonogram images of the fetus, 
play the sound of the fetal heartbeat, and explain the results of both exams 
to the woman seeking an abortion.263 Furthermore, the woman had to 
certify that the physician complied with the law’s requirements, forcing her 
to acknowledge the unwanted information that had been conveyed.264 
Equating these requirements with those upheld in earlier cases, the court 
argued that “required disclosures of a sonogram, the fetal heartbeat, and 
their medical descriptions are the epitome of truthful, non-misleading 
information.”265 
Without engaging with the fundamental appropriateness of these laws, 
we can take three tentative lessons from the forced ultrasound controversy. 
First, though controversial, there appears to be significant political support 
for forcing or strongly encouraging women to view ultrasound images. The 
fact that a significant number of states have been willing to pass these laws 
undermines any claim that there is unwavering support for a broad RNTK 
unwanted medical information. Second, the circuit split suggests that some 
courts are willing to entertain the idea that the state’s interest in preserving 
life overrides an individual’s right to make decisions about the kind of 
medical information that is revealed to them. Notably, the Supreme Court 
 
 257. North Carolina Women’s Right to Know Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 90-21.80 to -21.92 
(2011). 
 258. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 243. 
 261. Id. at 242. See also Pruitt v. Nova Health Sys., 134 S. Ct. 617 (2013) (striking down a 
mandatory ultrasound law pursuant to Casey). 
 262. Tex Med Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 580 (5th Cir. 
2012). 
 263. See id. at 573; see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4) (West 2014). 
 264. Tex Med Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 
2012). 
 265. Id. at 577–78. 
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has refused to resolve the existing circuit split.266 Finally, it should be 
stressed that the courts that overturned the mandatory ultrasound laws did 
so on the basis of First Amendment jurisprudence rather than an individual 
RNTK.267 If protecting an individual’s RNTK was clearly included in the 
well-established right to refuse treatment, it stands to reason the courts 
would have at least partially relied on that as a component of their 
reasoning. 
2. Court-Ordered Genetic Testing in Toxic Tort Cases 
Toxic torts are civil actions arising from alleged harm suffered by a 
plaintiff who was exposed to a “chemical substance, emission, or 
product.”268 In order to recover, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he or 
she was exposed to the relevant chemical, and that the exposure resulted in 
demonstrable, significant, and lasting physical or psychological harm.269 A 
paradigmatic case might involve an individual with a cancer diagnosis (e.g., 
lung cancer) who claims to have been exposed to a carcinogenic chemical 
(e.g., asbestos) in an industrial setting.270  
Since many medical conditions can be mediated by genetic 
susceptibility to illness, parties to toxic torts cases, particularly defendants, 
have reason to seek relevant genetic testing of the plaintiff, particularly as 
genetic tests have become more sophisticated.271 Under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, courts have the power to “order a party whose mental or 
physical condition—including blood group—is in controversy to submit to 
a physical or mental examination by a suitably licensed or certified 
examiner.”272  
Legal scholars have recognized, however, that court-mandated genetic 
testing can be intrusive and can lead to individual harm.273 For example, 
Anthony Niedwiecki has criticized Rule 35, arguing: 
 
 266. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Cases on Pre-Abortion Ultrasounds, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 15, 2015. 
 267. See David Orentlicher, Abortion and Compelled Physician Speech, 43 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 9, 9 (2015) (explaining that states impose mandates on abortion providers based on the 
First Amendment and the doctrine of informed consent). 
 268. KAREN A. GOTTLIEB, TOXIC TORTS PRACTICE GUIDE 5 (Spring ed. 2015). 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Randi B. Weiss et al., The Use of Genetic Testing in the Courtroom, 34 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 889, 889 (1999) (“as testing methodologies become more sophisticated, the use of genetic 
test results is likely to expand, particularly in toxic tort litigation, to provide evidence of 
causation.”). 
 272. FED. R. CIV. P. 35(1). 
 273. See Mark A. Rothstein, Preventing the Discovery of Plaintiff Genetic Profiles by 
Defendants Seeking to Limit Damages in Personal Injury Litigation, 71 IND. L.J. 877, 888–89 
(1996) (arguing that genetic testing should never be compelled because of concerns about non-
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These risks become even more prevalent when the genetic 
information reveals a disease or disorder that is incurable or 
untreatable. Without an analysis of the informational risks, courts 
fail to fully understand the depth of intrusiveness caused by the 
Rule 35 examination. Analyzing the informational risks 
associated with the test requires a close examination of the 
potential impact that the information garnered from the test could 
have on the individual being tested. The impact may be 
psychological trauma to the individual tested, as well as a 
violation of privacy through disclosure of the results to sources 
outside of the litigation.274  
Nevertheless, Rule 35 has been widely interpreted as allowing a compelled 
test if there is “good cause” to seek the medical information, and if the 
information is relevant to the individual’s health status that is “in 
controversy” due to litigation.275 As a result, examples of compelled 
genetic testing abound.276 
Furthermore, Hoffmann and Rothenberg conducted a survey of judges, 
asking whether they would compel genetic testing in a variety of 
scenarios.277 Judges were sensitive to the psychosocial concerns associated 
with forced genetic testing, particularly “the psychological impact of 
receiving unwanted information about a lethal and incurable genetic 
condition.”278 Nevertheless, approximately 80% of the judges surveyed 
indicated that they would still compel genetic testing to determine whether 
a genetic condition either made the plaintiff especially sensitive to pain or 
was the most likely cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Further, over 70% said 
they would order such testing to determine whether the plaintiff had a 
genetic condition necessary for a given toxic exposure to produce 
disease.279 
 
maleficence and autonomy); Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 14 J.L. & 
POL’Y 7, 35–36 (2006) (raising concerns about the privacy and discrimination risks to plaintiffs 
whose genetic information is placed into evidence); Jennifer M. Champagne, Genetic Testing and 
Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation: “Admissibility and Evaluation”, 13 N. C. J.L. & TECH 1, 24 
(2011) (“[g]iven the highly personal and sensitive nature of genetic data, there is a strong need to 
take precautions to prevent others from gaining access to such information.”). 
 274. Anthony S. Niedwiecki, Science Fact or Science Fiction? The Implications of Court-
Ordered Genetic Testing Under Rule 35, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 295, 339 (2000). 
 275. Id. at 301–02. 
 276. See id. at 299–300 (stating that Rule 35 and similar state rules have provided courts with 
wide authority to order genetic testing). 
 277. Diane E. Hoffmann & Karen H. Rothenberg, Judging Genes: Implications of the Second 
Generation of Genetic Tests in the Courtroom, 66 MD. L. REV. 858, 873–74 (2007). 
 278. Id. at 908. 
 279. See id. at 880–84 (observing that judges appreciated the objectiveness of genetic testing in 
these scenarios where the results can either rule out alternate causes or validate the plaintiff’s 
allegations to help make the decision process easier and more accurate). See also Diane E. 
Hoffmann & Karen H. Rothenberg, When Should Judges Admit or Compel Genetic Tests?, 310 
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3. Duty to Warn Cases 
There have been a number of significant cases about medical 
professionals’ duty to warn others about information revealed in the course 
of treating a patient.280 These cases are instructive because they bring into 
focus the tension between a patient’s rights (e.g., privacy, confidentiality, 
autonomy) and third-party interests. What becomes apparent through an 
examination of this jurisprudence is the fact that courts appear quite willing 
to override the former when sufficient justification exists, often for reasons 
that sound very much like those that would be used to override a RNTK 
(e.g., preventing harm to third parties, preservation of life).281 
Since clinical genetic testing is relatively new, there haven’t been 
many cases directly addressing the obligations of physicians vis-à-vis 
disclosure of hereditary health risk information to relatives.282 The two 
most prominent cases, however, seem to suggest that courts believe that 
physicians have a duty to consider the interests beyond those of their 
specific patient.283 In Pate v. Threlkel, the plaintiff was diagnosed with a 
late stage form of medullary thyroid carcinoma, a hereditary disease that her 
mother had been treated for three years earlier.284 Pate sued her mother’s 
physicians arguing that they had possessed a duty to educate their patient 
about the genetic nature of her disease, so that she could have an 
opportunity to pass that information on to her children.285 The court found 
 
SCIENCE 241, 241–42 (2005) (confirming the results of judges’ preferences to compel a test “to 
establish that the defendant’s negligence was not the cause of the plaintiff’s injury” because 
confirming a diagnosis is more objective than predicting one). 
 280. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 347–48 (Cal. 1976); Safer v. 
Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App Div. 1996). 
 281. See, e.g., Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345–48 (holding that a psychologist has an obligation of 
confidentiality to his or her patients, but under reasonable circumstances where a third party is 
most likely to become a potential victim of the patient, the psychologist has a duty to warn the 
third party); Safer, 677 A.2d at 1192 (holding that a physician owes a duty to warn patient’s 
family member(s) of genetic disorders that can be avoidable or treated properly if addressed early-
on). 
 282. Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 277, at 865–66, n.16 (recognizing that newer genetic 
testing that goes beyond simple DNA fingerprinting has been slow to become a viable resource in 
litigation). 
 283. See, e.g., Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So.2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1995) (“[W]hen the prevailing 
standard of care creates a duty that is obviously for the benefit of certain identified third parties 
and the physician knows of the existence of those third parties, then the physician’s duty runs to 
those third parties.”); Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App Div. 
1996) (recognizing that duty is owed not only to the patient himself but that it also “extend[s] 
beyond the interests of a patient to members of the immediate family of the patient who may be 
adversely affected by a breach of that duty”) (quoting Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 839 
(N.J. 1981). 
 284. Pate, 661 So.2d at 279. 
 285. Id. 
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that there was a duty to warn about the genetic component of a disease, but 
that simply informing the patient could discharge this duty.286 
A year later, in Safer v. Estate of Pack, a New Jersey appellate court 
went further, ruling that physicians have an even broader duty to warn 
third-party relatives about genetic information.287 This case had similar 
facts to Pate, in that a parent was diagnosed with a hereditary disease 
(colorectal cancer), which his daughter (the plaintiff) also subsequently 
acquired.288 The patient’s daughter argued that her father’s physician had a 
duty to warn at-risk relatives so that they could seek out early monitoring 
and/or treatment to mitigate the course of the disease.289 Pushing well past 
the holding in Pate, this court found that simply disclosing the information 
to the patient might not discharge the physician’s duty to warn.290 Arguing 
that genetic risk is analogous to an infectious public health threat,291 the 
court required that “reasonable steps be taken to assure that the information 
reaches those likely to be affected or is made available for their benefit.”292 
Recognizing that this expanded duty entails making trade-offs, the court 
acknowledged that sometimes the wishes of the patient might have to be 
overridden for the benefit of their relatives.293 Speculating about a case 
where there was evidence that a patient explicitly requested not to disclose 
genetic risk to relatives, the court made it clear that they were willing to 
consider asking “whether, as a matter of law, there are or ought to be any 
limits on physician-patient confidentiality.”294 
Without a strong line of comparable cases, it is hard to know exactly 
how far courts will be willing to push this issue. Safer was subsequently 
overturned by the New Jersey legislature, and has not been widely 
followed. Subsequent academic commentary was generally negative 
 
 286. Id. at 280–82 (holding that a physician has an indirect duty to significant third parties who 
are within the “zone of foreseeable risk” of harm or danger, thus the physician only needs to 
inform his or her patient of this harm or danger in hopes that the patient will relay the information 
to the pertinent third parties). 
 287. Safer, 677 A.2d at 1192. 
 288. Id. at 1189–90 (identifying multiple polyposis as a hereditary disease that can develop 
into colorectal cancer if left untreated); see also Pate, 661 So.2d at 279 (Fla. 1995) (identifying 
medullary thyroid carcinoma as the genetic disease that was transferred to the patient’s daughter). 
 289. Safer, 677 A.2d at 1190. 
 290. Id. at 1192 (“We decline to hold as the Florida Supreme Court did in Pate v. Thelkel, that, 
in all circumstances, the duty to warn will be satisfied by informing the patient.”). 
 291. Id. (“In terms of foreseeability especially, there is no essential difference between the type 
of genetic threat at issue here and the menace of infection, contagion or a threat of physical 
harm.”). 
 292. Id. 
 293. See id. at 1192–93 (“It may be necessary, at some stage, to resolve a conflict between the 
physician's broader duty to warn and his fidelity to an expressed preference of the patient that 
nothing be said to family members about the details of the disease.”). 
 294. Id. at 1193. 
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(presaging many of the arguments that would be made more than a decade 
later in the RNTK debate),295 though a major genetic professional society 
issued guidance that physicians should be permitted to breach a patient’s 
confidentiality under limited circumstances.296 At the very least, it is 
reasonable to say that these cases suggest that courts might be willing to 
consider placing limits on patient control over their own genetic 
information. To say something more definitive, we have to look to a better-
developed area of law with very clear parallels to genetic testing: forced 
HIV testing and/or disclosure of HIV-status. 
The forced HIV testing jurisprudence provides strong evidence that 
courts are readily willing to override individual preferences about receiving 
or disclosing sensitive medical information.297 The validity of compelled 
testing and disclosure has been regularly disputed, but these challenges 
 
 295. See, e.g., Kenneth Offit et al., The “Duty to Warn” a Patient’s Family Members About 
Hereditary Disease Risks, 292 JAMA 1469, 1472 (2004) (arguing that “physicians are in no 
position to undertake the primary responsibility for identifying and communicating with an untold 
number of their patients’ relatives who might be at some unspecified risk from genetic 
predispositions” because it would create impractical burdens that “discourage physician 
involvement in the merging subspecialty of genetic medicine”); Faith Lagay, A Physician’s Role 
in Informing Family Members of Genetic Risk, 7 AMA J. ETHICS, June 1, 2005 (concluding that 
the AMA guideline for medical ethics “does not—explicitly or implicitly—encourage physicians 
to breach patient confidentiality.”); Lisa S. Lehmann et al., Disclosure of Familial Genetic 
Information: Perceptions of the Duty to Inform, 109 AM. J. MED. 705, 709 (2000) (finding that the 
majority of women surveyed “did not believe that physicians should breach the confidentiality of 
genetic information”); Gary N. McAbee et al., Commentary, Physician’s Duty to Warn Third 
Parties About the Risk of Genetic Diseases, 102 PEDIATRICS 140, 141–42 (1998) (arguing that 
these cases have necessitated overriding legislation “to establish more appropriate guidelines”).   
 296. See AM. SOC’Y HUMAN GENETICS SOCIAL ISSUES SUBCOMM. ON FAMILIAL 
DISCLOSURE, PROFESSIONAL DISCLOSURE OF FAMILIAL GENETIC INFORMATION, 62 AM. J. HUM. 
GENETICS 474, 474 (1998) (stating that disclosure should be allowed when “attempts to encourage 
disclosure on the part of the patient have failed; where the harm is highly likely to occur and is 
serious and foreseeable; where the at-risk relative(s) is identifiable; and where either the disease is 
preventable/treatable or medically accepted standards indicate that early monitoring will reduce 
the genetic risk,” and when “[t]he harm that may result from failure to disclose should outweigh 
the harm that may result from disclosure.”). But see AMA Code of Med. Ethics, Op. 2.131 (2003) 
(stressing the physician’s duty of confidentiality and limiting the physician’s role to facilitating 
the disclosure by the patient); Sara Taub et al., Managing Familial Risk in Genetic Testing, 8 
GENETICS TESTING 356, 358 (2004) (citing two different guidelines for familial disclosure–The 
American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG) and The President’s Commission for the Study of 
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research–to demonstrate that 
breach of confidentiality would only be justified in rare situations); AM. SOC’Y OF CLINICAL 
ONCOLOGY, American Society of Clinical Oncology, Policy Statement Update: Genetic Testing 
for Cancer Susceptibility, 21 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2397, 2397 (2003) (counseling providers to 
“remind patients of the importance of communicating test results to family members . . . ”). 
 297. Robin C. Miller, Annotation, Validity, and Propriety Under Circumstances, of Court-
Ordered HIV Testing, 87 A.L.R. 5th 631, § I(2)(a) (2001) (demonstrating that some courts have 
used their inherent authority to mandate HIV testing regardless of the preferences of the parties). 
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have nearly always been dismissed.298 It should be noted that the courts 
have not imposed HIV testing blindly, recognizing that, like genetic 
information, there can be very real psychosocial risks associated with 
unwanted disclosure of an individual’s HIV status.299 Despite readily 
recognizing these concerns, courts have still compelled testing, arguing that 
concerns about the RNTK are outweighed by a range of legitimate 
justifications.300 While these cases have predominantly been brought in the 
criminal context,301 there are also a number of civil decisions that 
demonstrate courts’ willingness to consider interests beyond those of 
patient autonomy.302  
In addition to case law, there are a number of federal and state HIV 
non-disclosure laws that also provide evidence of our political willingness 
to override an individual’s ability to control their own sensitive health 
information.303 These laws generally prohibit disclosure of someone’s HIV 
 
 298. Id. (noting that several courts have reasoned and held that mandated HIV testing does not 
violate an individual’s right to equal protection, prohibition of ex post facto laws, freedom of 
religion, due process, or privacy). 
 299. See, e.g., Agosto v. Trusswal Systems Corp., 142 F.R.D. 118, 120 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (“The 
Court is aware of the delicate nature of HIV and AIDS-related information. Given the nature of 
the disease and the public’s attitudes towards those who contract AIDS or test positive for the HIV 
virus, Plaintiff's desire to protect the confidentiality of this information is understandable.”); 
Virgin Islands v. Roberts, 756 F. Supp. 898, 901–02 (V.I. 1991) (recognizing that although blood 
testing is innocuous and commonplace for routine health screening, revealing whether an 
individual has HIV has more “devastating consequences” due to “prejudice and apprehension that 
its diagnosis typically signifies a social death as concrete as the physical one which follows”); 
State v. Superior Court, 930 P.2d 488, 493 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (acknowledging that when 
testing an adolescent for HIV, “a positive test result would likely be psychologically traumatic, 
given the absence of a present cure for AIDS”). 
 300. Miller, supra note 297, at II(B)(1)6 §11(a) (noting that courts use a balancing test, 
weighing the interests of opposing parties, to justify testing in a range of situations). See, e.g., 
Agosto, 142 F.R.D. at 120 (holding that although plaintiff has privacy rights to protect his HIV 
status, if plaintiff is to continue with a suit in order to recover for pain and suffering from his 
employer, it would be necessary to disclose his health status, including his HIV diagnosis); Virgin 
Islands, 756 F. Supp. at 904 (stating that “the Government has a substantial interest in curbing the 
transmission of HIV” because “[t]he outcome of a potential source’s test affects the degree to 
which a person should undertake precautionary measures to ensure the virus is not spread to 
others,” which in effect outweighs the defendant’s right to privacy); State, 930 P.2d at 493 
(concluding that “the State’s interest in assisting victims [of sexual crimes] significantly 
outweighs the privacy interest of the juvenile” in resisting HIV testing). 
 301. See Miller, supra note 297, at I §2(a), II(A)(1) §3, §6 (demonstrating that courts have 
been willing to impose HIV testing in a range of criminal contexts, including sexual assault, 
prostitution, and intravenous drug use). 
 302. Id. at III.B (demonstrating that courts have been willing to impose HIV testing in a range 
of civil cases, even in the face of a number of challenges, such as Fourth Amendment 
unreasonable search and seizure, Equal Protection, ex post facto laws, freedom of religion, 
substantive Due Process, and the right to privacy). 
 303. See State Statutes or Regulations Expressly Governing Disclosure of Fact That Person 
Has Tested Positive for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or Acquired Immunodeficiency 
Syndrome (AIDS), A.L.R. 5th 149, 159–60, 169–70. 
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status, but typically contain a set of exceptions. Most commonly, HIV-
status can be revealed when there is a “compelling need” or “good 
cause.”304 While these terms have been subject to judicial interpretation, 
courts have interpreted them broadly, allowing disclosure in a wide range of 
contexts.305 Similarly, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (“HIPAA”) Privacy Rule contains a public interest exception, which 
allows medical professionals to disclose “individually identifiable health 
information” when there is a “serious and imminent threat to the health or 
safety of a person or the public.”306 
*** 
The cases establishing a right to refuse medical treatment are explicitly 
rooted in our history and tradition of protecting bodily integrity, never 
mentioning the distinct concept of psychological integrity. In a RNTK case 
of first impression, the question is whether courts would readily expand 
established protection of bodily integrity to incorporate protection of an 
individual’s psychological integrity. This seems unlikely. Given the 
controversial debate about the scope and propriety of substantive due 
process jurisprudence,307 courts seem to have become reluctant to 
haphazardly expand constitutionally protected liberty interests.308 The 
current judicial approach appears to involve carefully “identifying a narrow 
category of liberty interests that are deemed sufficiently ‘fundamental’ to 
warrant heightened scrutiny . . . .”309  
There appears to be enough judicial acceptance of infringement on 
psychological integrity that one can reasonably predict that courts would 
find purchase in the distinction between physical and psychological 
integrity. It is unlikely that courts would be willing to independently 
establish psychological integrity as a right requiring constitutional 
protection, given the lack of a clear history and legal tradition of such 
protections, and the fact that it would be monumentally difficult to establish 
the contours of protection for a concept as amorphous and potentially 
 
 304. Id. at 159–60. 
 305. Id. (demonstrating that courts have upheld exceptions for mandatory disclosure of HIV-
status in a range of contexts, including for surgeons, defendant in prostitution cases, and where 
there is a “clear and imminent danger to individual's health”). 
 306. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2014). 
 307. Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 
408, 411 (2010) (“Critics of substantive due process have condemned the doctrine as, among other 
things, a “contradiction in terms,” an “oxymoron,” a “momentous sham,” a “made-up, atextual 
invention,” and the “most anticonstitutional branch of constitutional law.” Substantive due process 
“has been criticized both as textually implausible and as contrary to basic principles of democratic 
self-government.”). 
 308. See id. at 510–11 (noting the controversy and opposition in some circles to modern 
substantive due process decisions such as Lawrence v. Texas and Roe v. Wade). 
 309. Id. at 427. 
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expansive as psychological integrity. Having critically argued against the 
philosophical and legal arguments for a strong RNTK, in the next section I 
marshal social science and psychology data to demonstrate that the RNTK 
is a malleable concept, and to make a series of positive arguments against 
the status quo position of honoring a strong RNTK.  
 
V. MOVING AWAY FROM A STRONG RNTK 
In Part II, I described the various arguments that recent commentators 
and scholars have made in favor of honoring a strong RNTK. While these 
voices represented a clear majority position, I believe that there are a 
number of compelling arguments in defense of a more skeptical view about 
the RNTK. In this Part, I begin by presenting data suggesting that the 
strength of people’s views about the RNTK is much softer than one might 
believe, leading us to reconsider the propriety of instinct to frame the 
RNTK as such a strong right. I then reframe the debate away from an 
autonomy-dominated perspective, providing a comprehensive analysis of 
the harms and benefits that result from adhering to a strong RNTK position. 
From this analysis, I conclude that the potential health benefits of 
abandoning a strong RNTK greatly outweigh the concomitant harms, 
thereby challenging the idea that psychosocial concerns should 
automatically get to trump the prospect of life-saving intervention. Finally, 
I end by exploring two additional considerations that are relevant to any 
rigorous discussion of the RNTK: moral distress and genetic 
exceptionalism. 
A.  The Identified Life Effect 
There seems to be overwhelming support for the RNTK in the genetics 
community.310 In a survey of genetics professionals, when asked how they 
would respond to a patient that declined to receive results from the ACMG 
list, only 19% said that they would return findings regardless of the 
patient’s preferences.311 Qualitative data similarly supports the claim that 
the RNTK is held to be of paramount important.312  
 
 310. See generally Yu et al., supra note 92, at 79 (stating that “[t]he vast majority of genetics 
professionals agreed that the preferences of a patient or family should guide which incidental 
results are offered for return”). 
 311. Id.  
 312. See Grove et al., supra note 93, at 6–7; ACMG, supra note 94, at 664–65 
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These studies are informative, but potentially misleading because of a 
psychological bias known as the identified life (or victim) effect.313 This 
phenomenon is related to people’s greater willingness to help specific, 
identified people, relative to abstract or theoretical ideas of people in 
need.314 Functionally, the idea is that people aren’t very good at 
understanding tradeoffs in the abstract, but are much better at weighing 
costs and benefits in a specific, concrete scenario.315 Schelling, in his 
seminal work on the economics of preventing human death, highlighted the 
distinction between individual and aggregate lives, arguing that people do 
not feel an emotional tie to a “statistical life” and are therefore less 
motivated to provide help to unidentified victims.316 For example, stories 
about specific victims elicit significantly higher levels of charitable 
donations compared to anonymous victims.317 There is often a substantial 
spike in emergency aid donations in the months after a major disaster, even 
though there is perpetual chronic need for such assistance.318 In the medical 
realm, there is evidence that physicians make different decisions when 
evaluating an individual patient than when considering an anonymous 
group of comparable patients.319 It appears that physicians give more 
weight to patients’ individual concerns when considering them on their own 
and more weight to general criteria of effectiveness when considering them 
as a group.320 
It shouldn’t be surprising then, that while there is certainly strong 
support for the RNTK in the abstract, there is reason to believe that support 
is softer than it appears. Asking about the RNTK in the abstract unduly 
 
 313. Tehila Kogut & Ilana Ritov, The “Identified Victim” Effect: An Identified Group, or Just 
a Single Individual?, 18 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 157, 158 (2005). 
 314. See id. at 164–65. 
 315. Karen E. Jenni & George Loewenstein, Explaining the Identifiable Victim Effect, 14 J. 
RISK UNCERTAINTY 235, 236 (1997); Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, Helping a 
Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability, 26 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 5, 11 (2003) 
(arguing that identifiable victims seem to produce a greater empathic response, accompanied by 
greater willingness to make personal sacrifices to provide aid); George Loewenstein et al., 
Statistical, Identifiable, and Iconic Victims, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE at 34–35, 44 
(Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006) (showing that people respond more strongly to 
identifiable rather than statistical victims even when identification provides absolutely no 
information about the victims). 
 316. Thomas C. Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 127, 129–30 (Samuel B. Chase ed., 1968). 
 317. Kogut & Ritov, supra note 313, at 161–62. 
 318. Deborah A. Small et al., Sympathy and Callousness: The Impact of Deliberative Thought 
on Donations to Identifiable and Statistical Victims, 102 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. AND HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 143, 143–44, 152 (2007). 
 319. Donald A. Redelmeier & Amos Tversky, Discrepancy Between Medical Decisions for 
Individual Patients and for Groups, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1162, 1162 (1990). 
 320. Id. 
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focuses the respondent solely on respect for autonomy. Conversely, real 
world cases that highlight a tension between autonomy and beneficence can 
cause support for the RNTK to drop significantly.  
Take the scenario outlined in the introduction: P is having her genome 
sequenced as part of a diagnostic work-up for what is suspected to be a rare 
genetic disorder. During the informed consent process, she clearly checks 
the box opting not to receive any incidental genetic results. During their 
analysis of her genomic data, her physicians happen to find evidence of 
high genetic risk for Hereditary Non-Polyposis Colon Cancer (“HNPCC”). 
They believe that this information will prevent serious disease and perhaps 
even save P’s life. Should they disclose the finding, even though P 
indicated that she did not want to receive any secondary findings?  
A survey of 800 Institutional Review Board (“IRB”) members and 
staff about their views on genetic incidental findings (“GIFs”) demonstrates 
how malleable views on the RNTK can be.321 Respondents were first asked 
about the RNTK in the abstract: “Do research participants have a right not 
to know their own genetic information? In other words, would it be 
acceptable for them to choose not to receive any GIFs?”322 When presented 
in this abstract manner, an overwhelming majority (96%) endorsed the 
RNTK.323 But when asked a version of the above case where a specific 
patient has chosen not to receive incidental findings, only 35% indicated 
that the individual’s RNTK should definitely be respected, and 28% said 
that they would probably honor the request not to know.324 Interestingly, 
the percentage of respondents who indicated that they did not support the 
RNTK increased from 2% at baseline to 26% when presented with the 
specific case.325 The percentage of people who are unsure similarly jumps, 
from 1% to 11%.326 
These data demonstrate that support for a strong RNTK is soft; while 
autonomy and the RNTK may seem sacrosanct in isolation, forcing people 
to confront the tradeoffs inherent in real world scenarios changes many 
minds. This suggests that practical conceptions about the RNTK are less 
absolute than some of the recent literature would have us believe.  
 
 321. Catherine Gliwa et al., Institutional Review Board Perspectives on Obligations to 
Disclose Genetic Incidental Findings to Research Participants, GENETICS MED., Nov. 19, 2015 
(advance online publication). 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. at 4.  
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. 
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B. Analyzing the Impact of a Strong RNTK 
If views on the RNTK are less settled than one might have previously 
believed, and if people are open to considering tradeoffs between autonomy 
and beneficence, then it becomes important to rigorously examine what 
those tradeoffs might entail. This kind of analysis has thus far been absent 
from the RNTK debate. The focus on an autonomy-based RNTK has had 
the unfortunate effect of short-circuiting discussion of the topic.327 
Specifically, the autonomy-dominated conversation has focused on the 
harms associated with not honoring individual preferences.328 That focus 
has not allowed for a comprehensive analysis of the harms and benefits of 
honoring or ignoring the RNTK. The reality is any policy will have 
potential negative consequences. Whichever option is chosen, we will 
necessarily be making a mistake in one of two directions: unwanted 
disclosure, or lost opportunity for medical intervention. In this section, I lay 
out the full set of relevant considerations, and explore some of the relevant 
empirical data that can help us to fully assess the overall impact of any 
RNTK policy.  
Specifically, there are three empirical questions that should be 
carefully considered. The first two questions are necessary to understand 
the scope and magnitude of harms that would result from a decision to 
create policies that de-emphasize a strong RNTK, asking about the 
frequency and magnitude of possible harms from unwanted disclosure: (1) 
How many people genuinely don’t want to know genetic information about 
themselves if it could have a profound impact on morbidity or mortality? 
(2) If people were given genetic risk information that they would have 
preferred not to know, what is the magnitude of the harm they actually 
experience? The third question explores the possible negative ramifications 
of honoring a strong RNTK: (3) If we actively solicit patient preferences for 
knowing or not knowing, how many people undergoing genomic 
sequencing would erroneously or accidentally fail to be notified of 
potentially lifesaving information? 
1. How many people genuinely don’t want to know genetic 
information about themselves if it could have a profound impact 
on morbidity or mortality?  
Available data support the reasonable claim that the overwhelming 
majority of people would want to be given genetic risk information that will 
 
 327. Supra Part III.B. 
 328. Supra Part III.B.1. 
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have a direct impact on their health.329 For example, in one study, nearly all 
respondents wanted to learn about a range of genetic risk factors, with 90% 
wanting to learn about non-actionable health risks and 96% wanting to learn 
about actionable genetic risk factors.330 Similarly, in the largest study to 
date of views toward the return of incidental findings resulting from 
sequencing research, nearly 5,000 members of the public were surveyed and 
nearly all of them (98%) wanted to learn about genetic risk for life-
threatening conditions that can be prevented.331 A strong majority even 
wanted to know about life-threatening conditions that cannot be treated.332 
So as a baseline, it seems fair to say that the vast majority of people would 
actively want to know high-value health information, which I’m defining as 
genetic findings associated with conditions where medical action can 
mitigate or prevent mortality or serious morbidity, and where there is strong 
evidence of the link between genotype and significant disease risk. 
Of course, that leaves some very small subset of the population who 
might not want to know this information. Although this is an empirical 
question that requires further study, it seems reasonable to assume that this 
small set of people who would not want to know is primarily comprised of 
individuals for whom clinical action might not be indicated (e.g., patients 
with a terminal illness, the elderly, people with a religious objection to 
receiving medical treatment, etc.).333 Proponents of the RNTK point to 
these kinds of examples in defense of their views.334 My counter-argument, 
which I will develop in more detail below, is that these relatively rare 
examples should not drive the RNTK debate; we should not be creating a 
broad RNTK policy based on a limited set of cases where the medical 
 
 329. See, e.g., David Kaufman et al., Subjects Matter: A Survey of Public Opinions About a 
Large Genetic Cohort Study, 10 GENETICS MED. 831, 836–38 (2008); Anna Middleton et al., 
Attitudes of Nearly 7000 Health Professionals, Genomic Researchers and Publics Toward the 
Return of Incidental Results from Sequencing Research, EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 1, 5 (2015); 
Martha F. Wright et al., Preferences for Results Delivery from Exome Sequencing/Genome 
Sequencing, 16 GENETICS MED. 442, 443–44 (2014); Nedal Arar et al., Preferences Regarding 
Genetic Research Results: Comparing Veterans and Nonveterans Responses, 13 PUB. HEALTH 
GENOMICS 431, 432–47 (2010); Juli M. Bollinger et al., Public Preferences Regarding the Return 
of Individual Genetic Research Results: Findings from a Qualitative Focus Group Study, 14 
GENETICS IN MED. 451, 452, 455 (2012); Tineke M. Meulenkamp et al., Communication of 
Biobanks’ Research Results: What Do (Potential) Participants Want?, 152A AM. J. MED. 
GENETICS 2482, 2486, 2488 (2010); Juli Murphy et al., Public Expectations for Return of Results 
from Large-Cohort Genetic Research, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 36, 38, 41 (2008); Layla Shahmirzadi 
et al., Patient Decisions for Disclosure of Secondary Findings among the First 200 Individuals 
Undergoing Clinical Diagnostic Exome Sequencing, 16 GENETICS MED. 395, 397 (2014). 
 330. Kaufman et al., supra note 329, at 835. 
 331. Middleton et al., supra note 329, at 1.  
 332. Id. at 4, 6. 
 333. See Wright et al., supra note 329, at 444–47. 
 334. See supra Part II.B. 
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information actually has little or no value to the individual. Rather, these 
cases can be addressed separately, because they represent scenarios where 
doctors can reasonably anticipate a need to actively solicit preferences. 
2. If people were given genetic risk information that they would 
have preferred not to know, what is the magnitude of the harm 
they actually experience?  
a. Psychological harms 
If the vast majority of people would want to know important genetic 
risk information, and if most of those who wouldn’t want to know can be 
bracketed, we are arguably left with an exceedingly small set of people. 
More empirical research is needed to ascertain the exact size and 
composition of this group, but whatever that number turns out to be, the 
next task is to examine the magnitude of harm that this small group will 
experience if given information that they would have preferred not to know. 
As discussed above, RNTK proponents frequently make claims about the 
danger of psychological harms flowing from disclosure of negative genetic 
information.335 These claims rely on limited data related to a few poorly-
targeted examples like HD and AD.336 What can the broader psychological 
literature tell us about our reactions to unfortunate genetic information? 
The short answer is that psychological research has demonstrated that 
people are terrible at affective forecasting, or predicting our future 
emotional reaction to both positive and negative events.337 For example, 
recent lottery winners typically overestimate the length and duration of their 
spike in happiness.338 Similarly, but in the opposite direction, people who 
have recently lost a loved one overestimate the length and duration of their 
negative emotional response to the traumatic event.339 In both cases, after 
an initial spike, people gradually tend to return to their previous baseline 
 
 335. See supra Part III.A. 
 336. See supra Part III.B.4. 
 337. See, e.g., Elisabeth W. Dunn & Simon M. Laham, Affective Forecasting: A User’s Guide 
to Emotional Time Travel, in AFFECT IN SOCIAL THINKING AND BEHAVIOR 177, 177–78 (Joseph 
P. Forgas ed., 2006); Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, in 35 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 345, 346, 401 (James M. Olson & Mark P. 
Zanna eds., 2003); Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting Knowing What 
to Want, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 131, 131, 134 (2005). 
 338. Brett Pelham, Affective Forecasting: The Perils of Predicting Future Feelings, PSYCHOL. 
SCI. AGENDA (Apr. 2004), http://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2004/04/pelham.aspx. 
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level of happiness.340 It appears that individuals are generally much more 
emotionally adaptable than they might realize. 
This is also true in the medical realm, where the literature suggests that 
an individual’s predictions concerning the emotional consequence of 
learning about genetic disease risk do not square with people’s actual ability 
to adapt to negative health information.341 In a broad range of medical 
contexts, there are data showing that the affective forecasting bias is 
particularly pronounced when healthy people are asked to assess the 
negative emotional impact of (theoretical) future health problems.342 
Specifically, people generally assume that receiving negative genetic 
information will be devastating, but research demonstrates that people are 
much better at coping with negative information than they think they will 
be.343 In reality, the negative psychological effect of receiving positive risk 
information for many untreatable conditions is generally transient and 
mild.344  
Of particular interest are the concepts of immune neglect and focal 
illusion. Immune neglect deals with “the failure to anticipate how easily and 
quickly we make sense of and adapt to negative events.”345 Essentially, the 
body has a sort of psychological immune system, which helps people deal 
with negative information, often making the actual impact of negative 
information significantly smaller than the expected negative impact.346 
However, when making a prediction about future emotional responses, we 
disregard our ability to cope, thereby overestimating the negative impact of 
information.347 Relatedly, the focal illusion bias “is the tendency to focus 
on the affective consequences of a single, focal future event, while ignoring 
the emotional impact of non-focal events on well-being.”348 This bias 
causes us to pay more attention to the negative implications of the topic at 
hand (i.e., the genetic test result that was just returned) while ignoring the 
 
 340. Wilson & Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, supra note 337, at 369, 393 (finding that 
people’s emotional reactions become less intense with time, in a phenomenon called emotional 
evanescence). 
 341. Jodi Halpern & Robert M. Arnold, Affective Forecasting: An Unrecognized Challenge in 
Making Serious Health Decisions, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1708, 1708, 1710 (2008) (finding 
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 342. S.A. Peters et al., The Future in Clinical Genetics: Affective Forecasting Biases in Patient 
and Clinician Decision Making, 85 CLINICAL GENETICS 312, 313–14 (2014). 
 343. Id. 
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 345. Id. at 313. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Peters et al., supra note 342, at 313–14 (2014). 
 348. Id. at 313. 
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positive mitigating effects that other aspects of life might offer (e.g., family, 
hobbies, etc.).349  
While the field hasn’t “systematically considered such biases in 
clinical genetics,”350 there is a growing body of data supporting the claim 
that concerns about psychological reactions to negative genetic results are 
likely overblown.351 One systematic review of 15 published papers on 
predictive genetic testing for a range of conditions found “no increased 
distress (general and situational distress, anxiety, and depression) in carriers 
or non-carriers at any point during the 12 months after testing.”352 
Furthermore, both carriers and non-carriers actually showed decreased 
distress after testing.353 Similarly, a review of the literature on responses to 
genetic testing of cancer susceptibility found that there was very little 
evidence of adverse psychological effects observed among people who 
learn that they have a genetic predisposition to certain cancers.354  
Even when the testing is for a condition like HD (an untreatable and 
devastatingly progressive neurological disorder) the evidence suggests that 
while carriers experience some short-term distress, long-term psychological 
distress is comparable to that of non-carriers.355 Reactions to learning about 
risk for other neurodegenerative disorders, such as AD, seem to follow a 
similar trajectory.356 One review article examined the health-related quality 
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 351. See, e.g., Bettina Meiser, Psychological Impact of Genetic Testing for Cancer 
Susceptibility: An Update of the Literature, 14 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 1060, 1060 (2005) (claiming 
that “[m]ost studies on the psychological impact of genetic testing among individuals” without 
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 352. Marita Broadstock et al., Psychological Consequences of Predictive Genetics Testing: A 
Systematic Review, 8 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 731, 731 (2008). 
 353. Id. 
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 355. See Bettina Meiser & Stewart Dunn, Psychological Impact of Genetic Testing for 
Huntington’s Disease: An Update of the Literature, 69 J. NEUROLOGY NEUROSURGERY 
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al., Psychological Effects of Presymptomatic DNA Testing for Huntington’s Disease in the Dutch 
Program, 56 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 526 (1994). 
 356. Robert C. Green et al., Disclosure of APOE Genotype for Risk of Alzheimer’s Disease, 
361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245, 245 (2009) (reporting no significant difference in anxiety levels 
between those who reviewed their test results and those who did not after being tested for a 
genetic predisposition to Alzheimer’s). 
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of life for patients after learning about increased risk for a range of 
neurodegenerative diseases, finding that 1) severe responses are rare; 2) to 
the extent that patients do experience anxiety or depression, it is generally 
transient; 3) and most patients do not experience regret.357 
The literature tells a similar story about the limited psychological 
impact of learning that one is at an increased risk of developing breast 
cancer or colon cancer.358 For example, one study demonstrated that while 
BRCA mutation carriers reported higher incidence of depression and other 
negative psychological effects at one and six months post-test, their 
psychological state returned to baseline levels by 12 months.359 A meta-
analysis echoed the theme that people are capable of adapting over time, 
concluding that the overall literature suggests that there is a brief period of 
increased distress after receiving a positive result, but that distress levels 
returned to a pre-test baseline over time.360  The literature for hereditary 
non-polyposis colon cancer also lends credence to the view that people may 
manifest short-term distress but do not generally experience long-term 
adverse psychological outcomes as a result of learning about their genetic 
risk status.361 
One must be careful when evaluating these data, as some of the studies 
have methodological limitations. Nevertheless, it is striking that RNTK 
proponents continue to make claims about the harmful psychological 
impact of genetic information when there is such limited empirical support 
for such concerns. More evidence about emotional reactions to genetic 
information would certainly be useful, but the existing literature at least 
raises important questions about whether we “systematically overestimate 
the durability and intensity of the affective impact of events on well-being,” 
thereby creating a “culture of risk-aversion in which patients may be opting 
out of potentially beneficial diagnostic and treatment regimes.”362  
 
 357. Jane S. Paulsen et al., A Review of Quality of Life After Predictive Testing for and Earlier 
Identification of Neurodegenerative Diseases, 110 PROGRESS NEUROBIOLOGY 1, 2 (2013). 
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b. Economic harms 
If psychological harms are likely to be minimal, that still leaves a 
question about economic harms (i.e., discrimination). The likelihood and 
magnitude of discrimination is somewhat more difficult to assess, but early 
experience with the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act (“GINA”) 
suggests that perhaps there is less cause for concern than previously 
thought. GINA was enacted in 2008, in response to concerns that public 
fears about genetic discrimination were inhibiting the adoption of clinical 
genetic testing.363 The law prohibited employers and health insurance 
companies from receiving genetic information (broadly defined) and from 
using genetic information as the basis for employment or actuarial 
decisions.364 GINA’s protections only apply when decisions are made on 
the basis of genetic risk information; once the disease has become manifest, 
GINA no longer applies (although other laws, such as the Americans with 
Disabilities Act might provide some protection).365 
In the years since its passage, however, there have been remarkably 
few cases requiring the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to 
exercise its enforcement power.366 Since 2010, there have only been an 
average of 278 claims filed per year.367 The majority of these claims were 
dismissed for lack of reasonable cause, with an annual average of merely 48 
cases reaching merit resolution.368 Damages appear to be minimal, 
averaging less than $1 million in total awards per year.369 These data 
suggest that while there are isolated incidents of genetic discrimination 
occurring in the employment and health insurance contexts, there is a 
significant gap between the fears that motivated GINA’s passage, and 
actual reality. This isn’t to say that genetic discrimination won’t become a 
more significant problem in the future. My claim is merely that there is 
little evidence of it being a widespread and egregious problem at the 
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moment. It is notable that the most highly publicized genetic discrimination 
case thus far involved employees being forced to submit to genetic testing 
in order to ascertain who was secretly leaving human excrement in their 
workplace.370 
GINA has been criticized, however, for not covering other areas of 
potential genetic discrimination, such as life insurance and long-term care 
insurance.371 These areas are difficult to assess in the absence of a GINA 
analog. It does appear that there are occasional instances of discrimination 
in these realms,372 but that they are primarily associated with untreatable 
single gene conditions, like Huntington’s disease,373 that I’ve argued carry 
little weight for purposes of determining whether there should be a broad 
RNTK.374 Even with some evidence of discrimination in these realms, a 
systematic review of existing data calls into question the need for a policy 
intervention.375 As one review article concluded, “With the notable 
exception of studies on Huntington’s disease, none of the studies reviewed 
here (or their combination) brings irrefutable evidence of a systemic 
problem of GD that would yield a highly negative societal impact.”376 
Again, this isn’t to suggest that genetic discrimination will never become a 
problem in life and long-term care insurance. Rather, my argument is that 
we should make a clear-eyed assessment of the frequency and magnitude of 
any economic harms flowing from disclosure of genetic risk information 
before automatically assuming a worst-case scenario. As we will explore in 
the next section, there are some potential negative effects associated with 
honoring a strong RNTK, which should be balanced against a rigorous 
evaluation of the harms associated with not doing so. 
3. If we actively solicit patient preferences for knowing or not 
knowing, how many people undergoing genomic sequencing 
would erroneously or accidentally fail to be notified of 
potentially lifesaving information?  
On one side of the scale, we have a very small group of people, who 
are arguably at very low risk of experiencing significant, lasting 
 
 370. Gina Kolata, ‘Devious Defecator’ Case Tests Genetics Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/02/health/devious-defecator-case-tests-genetics-law.html.  
 371. Rothstein, supra note 365, at 837. 
 372. See Mark A. Hall & Stephen S. Rich, Laws Restricting Health Insurers’ Use of Genetic 
Information: Impact on Genetic Discrimination, 66 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 293, 295, 302 
(2000) (noting instances of discrimination relating to life, disability and long-term care insurance). 
 373. Yann Joly et al., Genetic Discrimination and Life Insurance: A Systematic Review of the 
Evidence, 11 BMC MED. 25 (2013). 
 374. See supra Part III.B.4. 
 375. Joly et al., supra note 373, at 25, 36. 
 376. Id. at 36. 
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psychological or economic harm. On the other side, we would want to 
know the impact of adopting a robust RNTK policy that involved actively 
soliciting individual preferences. My argument is that such a policy would 
necessarily result in some loss of opportunity to provide people with 
valuable information because there is good reason to doubt our ability to 
accurately and reliably assess people’s true preferences. 
Any attempt to assess individual preferences will likely take place as 
part of the informed consent process. A typical model might look like this: 
Patients or research participants are given a written informed consent 
document that explains the risks and benefits of genomic sequencing, and 
includes discussion about the possibility of generating incidental findings. 
Perhaps after a conversation with the researcher or clinician (or perhaps 
not), the individual would be asked to indicate whether or not they are 
interested in learning about genetic risks unrelated to the condition under 
investigation. The choice might be binary (“Yes, I want to learning 
incidental findings” or “No, I don’t want to learn incidental findings”) or 
could present a menu of types of genetic findings any of which could be 
selected (e.g., serious/actionable, serious/non-actionable, late-onset, carrier 
status, etc.). 
There are a number of reasons to be skeptical about our ability to 
reliably assess an individual’s true preferences about knowing or not 
knowing genetic information. The first problem has to do with how people 
engage with informed consent documents. There are extensive data 
suggesting that people frequently do not carefully read consent forms, and 
when they do, that their understanding and appreciation of the content can 
often be lacking.377 These problems are acute enough that the research 
ethics community is continually trying to find ways to improve the process 
of obtaining informed consent.378  
The research demonstrating these effects has been extensive; one 
review article that employed quantitative methods to examine whether 
research subjects actually comprehended the information contained in a 
consent form found that only forty-seven of 427 published medical studies 
met specific criteria for comprehensibility, demonstrating that 
 
 377. See Henry W. Riecken & Ruth Ravich, Informed Consent to Biomedical Research in 
Veterans Administration Hospitals, 248 JAMA 344, 346 (1982) (pointing to data indicating that 
“most of the consent forms are written in language that requires reading ability at the college 
level” and only “27% of the patients [in the study] had more than a high school education”). 
 378. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Jerry Menikoff, Reforming the Regulations Governing 
Research with Human Subjects, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1145, 1147 (2011) (proposing to simplify 
consent documents so that they are more understandable). 
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comprehension varied widely and was often quite minimal.379 For example, 
one specific study showed that more than 25% of the participants had no 
idea about the purpose of the research, and only 10% could describe its 
goals completely.380 Other studies similarly demonstrated that a substantial 
proportion of subjects could not name study risks/side effects without 
prompting, and often did not understand basic research characteristics such 
as randomization and use of placebos.381 In one study of patients enrolled 
in cancer clinical trials, 74% did not recognize that they would be receiving 
non-standard treatment, 63% did not understand that they were at potential 
risk for increased harm from participation, 70% did not comprehend the 
experimental nature of the treatment, 29% did not internalize the fact that 
they might not receive any clinical benefits, and 25% did not appreciate that 
research trials are done mainly to benefit future patients.382  
If subjects are signing consent forms with such incomplete 
understanding of the important details contained therein, it seems 
questionable to have confidence in the infallibility of any process designed 
to solicit preferences about knowing genetic incidental findings. This is 
particularly true given the inherent complexity of genetic information, and 
the associated difficulty patients will have in making a choice in that 
context. Many commentators have expressed a concern that the wide range 
of types of genomic findings will be overwhelming and could become a 
significant barrier to implementing truly informed consent.383 For example, 
as Holm and colleagues have argued:  
 
 379. Amulya Mandava et al., The Quality of Informed Consent: Mapping the Landscape. A 
Review of Empirical Data from Developing and Developed Countries, 38 J. MED. ETHICS 356, 
356–57 (2012). 
 380. Riecken & Ravich, supra note 377, at 345. 
 381. See, e.g., Mandava et al., supra note 379, at 357, 362 (showing that multiple studies have 
found that a small percentage of subjects actually understand the randomization process and the 
concept of a placebo); Jan M. Howard & David DeMets, How Informed is Informed Consent? The 
BHAT Experience, 2 CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIALS 287, 290–92 (1981) (finding that many 
subjects did understand basic information about their clinical trial, but overall, informed consent 
did not provide a robust and full understanding. For example, 47% of research participants did not 
know that they were assigned to treatment or placebo by chance, and only a minority of subjects 
were aware of all of the possible side effects); Margriet van Stuijvenberg et al., Informed Consent, 
Parental Awareness, and Reasons for Participating in a Randomised Controlled Study, 79 
ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 120, 120 (1998) (finding that while 73% of parents were aware 
of the major study characteristics, some had difficulty understanding the information provided). 
 382. Steven Joffe et al., Quality of Informed Consent in Cancer Clinical Trials: A Cross-
Sectional Survey, 358 LANCET 1772 (2001). 
 383. See, e.g., Bredenoord et al., supra note 72, at 29 (“Most if not all patients will have 
difficulties with making a reasonable selection out of the wide array of possible genetic findings. 
The quantity, significance, and ambiguity of the genetic data generated by NGS will make any 
reasonable choice beforehand highly complex.”); Knoppers, supra note 43, at 9 (“Unless the time 
period and the content of the right not to know are well laid out in the consent process, the 
emerging requirements for the return of results in genomics may rapidly become 
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To understand the implications of [preventive genome 
sequencing], a person will have to be informed about and (at least 
to some degree) understand the prevalence of each MAG 
[medically actionable gene], the relation between each MAG and 
its linked disease, including mode of inheritance and degree of 
penetrance, details about the disease, and details about the 
possible prevention and treatment options . . . . Thus, if we have 
problems informing people adequately about the relevant 
probabilities, risks, and benefits relevant to screening for one 
disease, how are we going to do this for 10, 20, or (in the future) 
many more diseases? And these are diseases that because of their 
genetic nature, furthermore, have potential implications not only 
for the person but also for his or her relatives. Even with the best 
patient support systems in the world we are unlikely to get 
anything approaching “informed consent.”384 
In the pre-genomic era when targeted genetic testing was the norm, 
patients could reasonably absorb the range of information they might 
receive; a single gene test typically only revealed information associated 
with the relevant condition.385 But when employing genome sequencing, it 
is impossible to know what kind of results will be generated, making the 
informed consent process that much more difficult.386 Ensuring patient 
comprehension and managing expectation becomes increasingly difficult as 
the amount of genomic data generated grows. 
Furthermore, it will even be difficult to adequately describe the variety 
of genomic information categories because of terminological confusion. 
Terms like “actionability,” “clinical utility,” and “clinical significance” are 
typically used to describe the kinds of findings someone might or might not 
desire, but there is a lack of conceptual clarity about exactly what those 
 
unmanageable.”); Bredenoord et al., Disclosure of Individual Genetic Data to Research 
Participants: The Debate Reconsidered, 27 TRENDS GENETICS 41–47 (2011); Amy L. McGuire & 
Laura M. Beskow, Informed Consent In Genomics and Genetic Research, 11 ANN. REV. 
GENOMICS HUM. GENETICS 361 (2010) (arguing that there are unique ethical issues raised by 
genetic research, both in the way research is conducted and the level of understanding of the 
participants, that make obtaining informed consent more difficult); ACMG BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS, Points to Consider for Informed Consent for Genome/Exome Sequencing, 15 
GENETICS MED. 748 (2013) (arguing that genomic sequencing poses heightened challenges for 
obtaining informed consent relative to the process of informed consent for other types of genetic 
testing); Ashley N. Tomlinson et al., “Not Tied Up Neatly with a Bow”: Professionals’ 
Challenging Cases in Informed Consent for Genomic Sequencing, J. GENETICS COUNSELING 1 
(2015); Gail E. Henderson, Is Informed Consent Broken?, 342 AM. J. MED. SCI. 267 (2011); Erika 
Check Hayden, Informed Consent: A Broken Contract, 486 NATURE 312 (2012). 
 384. Søren Holm & Thomas Ploug, Patient Choice and Preventive Genomic Sequencing—
More Trouble Upstream, 15 AM. J. BIOETHICS 24, 25 (2015). 
 385. Eckstein et al., supra note 40, at 193. 
 386. See id. at 190, 193–94 (stating that the results of secondary findings are often 
“unanticipated” and “unforeseen by either party at the time of consent”). 
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terms mean.387 For example, there seem to be at least two different 
conceptions of “actionability.”388 The narrow conception focuses on how 
the information can impact the individual’s clinical care by informing 
therapies or preventative interventions.389 The expanded view is more 
broadly patient-centered, including impact on clinical care, as well as 
somewhat more nebulous considerations like importance to the person’s life 
choices.390 If scholars in the field cannot agree on a unified definition of the 
terms used to describe the categories of genetic information presented, how 
can we be confident that patients will have a consistent and predictable 
understanding of the same?391 
There are also concerns about how preferences can shift over time.392 
Life events and the passage of time can change one’s views; the answer 
given as a single young adult might be different than the one that same 
person would give once they are married with children. But unless the 
medical world can develop a process for actively re-soliciting preferences 
(an unrealistic proposition) there is the very real risk that a binding decision 
made at a single point in time could become inconsistent with future 
desires. 
Informed consent is a cornerstone of bioethics, and with good reason. 
In its ideal form, it allows doctors and researchers to demonstrate respect 
for persons, and allows competent individuals to make autonomous choices 
about their engagement with medicine. The arguments made above should 
not be read as a wholesale indictment of informed consent. Rather, my 
point is that we should be skeptical about our capacity to adequately and 
accurately assess individual preferences about knowing or not knowing 
specific categories of genetic information. In particular, I question the 
validity of automatically privileging broad, hypothetical checkbox answers 
collected during a demonstrably imperfect informed consent process. While 
more empirical research would be helpful in determining the full extent of 
the problem, there is a very real risk that a policy of actively soliciting 
preferences about knowing or not knowing genetic information could result 
in people making choices that do not reflect their true values and 
 
 387. Id. at 190.  
 388. Id. at 197. 
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. 
 391. See, e.g., Kristi D. Graves et al., Public Perceptions of Disease Severity But Not 
Actionability Correlate with Interest in Receiving Genomic Results: Nonalignment with Current 
Trends in Practice, 18 PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 173, 181 (2015). 
 392. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Botkin, Informed Consent for Genetic Research, in CURRENT 
PROTOCOLS IN HUMAN GENETICS (Nicholas Dracopoli et al. eds., 2001).  
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preferences, thus erroneously or accidentally not receiving potentially 
lifesaving information.393  
C. Moral Distress 
I’ve argued that patient autonomy is not the only relevant value in this 
debate, and that it is important to seek out other possibly relevant 
considerations. In the last section, I examined the full range of effects that 
honoring or not honoring the RNTK would have on individual patients or 
research subjects. Now I turn to an examination of other relevant 
considerations, namely those raised by the interests of medical 
professionals. The RNTK can place researchers and clinicians in a difficult 
position. It is a vexing problem to possess genetic information that one 
deems to be clinically important, but to be precluded from disclosing it 
because a patient has exercised their RNTK. These medical professionals 
are apt to experience what we can colloquially call the “I-can’t-sleep-at-
night” problem. More technically, they are experiencing a phenomenon 
known as moral distress.394  
A concept that originated from the field of nursing, moral distress 
refers to the situation where one knows the morally correct course of action, 
but is constrained from taking it.395 Unlike a classic ethical dilemma, where 
there are two ethically justifiable, but non-optimal choices, moral distress 
involves feeling like there is a clearly correct, but unavailable choice to 
make.396 In normal clinical care, moral distress can be found in a range of 
situations where structural, legal, or institutional barriers prevent someone 
from doing what they feel would be right. These barriers can arise out of 
“clinical situations, factors internal to the individual professional, and 
factors present in unit cultures, the institution, and the larger health care 
 
 393. The obvious response to my argument is to suggest that when patients have chosen not to 
know, and their doctors find something that they think justifies revisiting that decision, just ask a 
second time. But if one truly wants to honor an expressed desire not to know, it seems practically 
impossible to ask the person in a way that doesn’t implicitly alert them to the fact that there has 
been a significant result. See Dorothy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher, Privacy and Disclosure in 
Medical Genetics Examined in an Ethics of Care, 5 BIOETHICS 212, 221 (1991) (“There is no way 
. . . to exercise the choice of not knowing, because in the very process of asking ‘Do you want to 
know whether you are at risk’ the geneticist has already made the essence of the information 
known.”).  
 394. Pauline W. Chen, When Doctors and Nurses Can’t Do the Right Thing, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
6, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/06/health/05chen.html. 
 395. ANDREW JAMETON, NURSING PRACTICE: THE ETHICAL ISSUES (1984). See also Elizabeth 
G. Epstein & Sarah Delgado, Understanding and Addressing Moral Distress, 15 ONLINE J. ISSUES 
NURSING Manuscript 1 (2010).  
 396. Epstein & Delgado, supra note 395, at 1–2. 
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environment.”397 For example, a doctor or nurse might feel moral distress 
when an institution has decided to keep a patient on life support, even 
though he or she firmly believes that doing so is not in the patient’s best 
interest.398 While most commonly discussed in the context of nursing, 
moral distress is experienced by a range of medical specialties.399 Medical 
geneticists and genetic counselors seem to be at particular risk. One study 
of genetic service providers found that 18% were considering leaving 
patient care because of distress.400 As the authors of that study noted, 
“[b]ecause of the emphasis on patient autonomy and nondirective 
counseling, genetic service providers also may experience moral distress 
when patients are making morally charged decisions, especially in prenatal 
genetic settings.”401 
From a professional perspective, the worry is that experiencing moral 
distress can have a lasting detrimental effect on medical practitioners, 
which some have termed “moral residue.”402 As Epstein and Delgado 
explain: 
In situations of moral distress, one’s moral values have been 
violated due to constraints beyond one’s control. After these 
morally distressing situations, the moral wound of having had to 
act against one’s values remains. Moral residue is long-lasting 
and powerfully integrated into one’s thoughts and views of the 
self. It is this aspect of moral distress—the residue that remains—
that can be damaging to the self and one’s career, particularly 
when morally distressing episodes repeat over time.403 
Given that a patient’s exercise of their RNTK presents a potential risk 
to medical professionals, the question then is how much weight we should 
give this concern. Stated another way, when is it permissible for a doctor’s 
moral interests (i.e., an orientation towards trying to prevent or ameliorate 
disease) to trump patient autonomy? 
 
 397. Ann B. Hamric, Empirical Research on Moral Distress: Issues, Challenges, and 
Opportunities, 24 HEC FORUM 39, 39 (2012). 
 398. Mary C. Corley, Nurse Moral Distress: A Proposed Theory and Research Agenda, 9 
NURSING ETHICS 636, 638–39 (2002). 
 399. See, e.g., Wendy J. Austin et al., The Balancing Act: Psychiatrists’ Experience of Moral 
Distress, 11 MED. HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 89, 89 (2007). See also Epstein & Delgado, supra note 
395, at 2 (citing to literature documenting moral distress in a range of healthcare professions). 
 400. Barbara A. Bernhardt et al., Distress and Burnout Among Genetic Service Providers, 11 
GENETICS IN MED. 527, 532 (2009). 
 401. Id. at 527. 
 402. Epstein & Delgado, supra note 395, at 2, 4. 
 403. Id. at 4. 
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This notion of beneficence trumping autonomy has been a frequent 
topic of exploration in the bioethics literature.404 For example, Edmund 
Pellegrino has argued that while autonomy is certainly an important 
principle, beneficence and autonomy should be complementary.405 
Physician autonomy should also be respected, as the physician has a claim 
to follow her own “conscience about what is good medicine and what is 
morally acceptable as a person.”406 Similarly, others have concluded that 
the morality associated with the medical profession sometimes makes it 
permissible to violate a patient’s autonomy.407 
This isn’t to say that a medical professional’s interests generally, and 
moral distress in particular, are sufficiently weighty to carry an argument 
against the RNTK. But considered in the overall context of a rigorous 
debate about whether or not we should honor an individual’s RNTK 
important medical information about him or herself, it certainly seems like 
moral distress is at least another relevant consideration in favor of arguing 
that it is appropriate to be skeptical about a broad, strong RNTK. 
D. Genetic Exceptionalism 
It has been popular to argue that genetic information requires special 
treatment, such as extra privacy protections, enhanced pre-test education 
and a distinct informed consent process.408 This position was supported by 
the strongly held notion that there is something different about genetic 
information.409 People have an instinct that genetic information is special, 
perhaps because genetic information can uniquely shed light on our familial 
 
 404. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and 
Obligations in the Physician-Patient Relationship, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH. L. POL’Y 47, 58 
(1994) (discussing conflicts that arise out of the potential incompatibility of beneficence and 
autonomy). 
 405. Id. at 47. 
 406. Id. at 51. 
 407. Ost, supra note 27, at 310–11 (“Underlying medicine is another, humanistic value-
orientation which calls upon the physician to do what he can to help the patient make autonomous 
decisions . . . . It is an insight of this sort, I suspect, that leads Beauchamp and Childress to the 
conclusion that it is sometimes permissible to violate the patient's autonomy (in the sense of 
freedom from external coercion) in order to promote autonomy.”). 
 408. Michael J. Green & Jeffrey R. Botkin, “Genetic Exceptionalism” in Medicine: Clarifying 
the Differences between Genetic and Nongenetic Tests, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 571, 571 
(2003). 
 409. See, e.g., Miguel Ruiz-Canela & J. Ignacio Valle-Mansilla, What Research Participants 
Want to Know about Genetic Research Results: The Impact of “Genetic Exceptionalism”, 6 J. 
EMPIRICAL RES. ON HUM. RES. ETHICS 39 (2011) (showing study results in which participants 
considered genetic data to be riskier than other types of medical data). 
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or ancestral relationships, or maybe because people (erroneously) subscribe 
to genetic determinism.410  
Beyond popular instincts, scholars have also made a number of more 
rigorous attempts to argue about the ways in which genetic information is 
unique.411 First, genetic exceptionalists have argued that genetic 
information is often predictive, rather than diagnostic, and thus can be used 
to predict an individual’s future health in ways that other kinds of non-
genetic medical information cannot.412 Genetic exceptionalists have also 
focused on the fact that since genetic information is an immutable part of 
your identity and cannot be altered, we should be careful to guard against 
the psychosocial and economic effects of disclosing genetic risk 
information.413 Finally, genetic information has implications for third 
parties; any genetic diagnosis or risk information is not just relevant to the 
patient, but also to their blood relatives.414   
Nevertheless, as the field of medical genetics has evolved, genetic 
exceptionalism has been subject to significant criticism.415 As Evans and 
Burke have argued: 
 
 410. Jim Evans & Wylie Burke, Genetic Exceptionalism: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 10 
GENETICS IN MED. 500, 501 (2008). 
 411. See, e.g., Patricia A. Roche & George J. Annas, Protecting Genetic Privacy, 2 NATURE 
REV. GENETICS 392, 393 (2001) (arguing that DNA sequence information is unique because it has 
information beyond medical history and current health status such as future conditions and traits 
shared with family members); Gail Geller et al., Genetic Testing for Susceptibility to Adult-Onset 
Cancer, 277 JAMA 1467, 1468 (1997) (warning that genetic information affects other family 
members, our future behavior, and can put a healthy patient in an “at-risk” category); Barbara 
Biesecker et al., Genetic Counseling for Families with Inherited Susceptibility to Breast and 
Ovarian Cancer, 269 JAMA 1970 (1993) (reporting that it is now possible to identify family 
members who carry a gene that predisposes women to breast and ovarian cancer). 
 412. Green & Botkin, supra note 408, at 572. 
 413. Id. at 572–73. 
 414. Id. at 572. 
 415. See, e.g., Thomas H. Murray, Genetic Exceptionalism and Future Diaries: Is Genetic 
Information Different from Other Medical Information?, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING 
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 60, 71 (Mark Rothstein ed., 1997) 
(proposing that genetic exceptionalism is an “overly dramatic view of the significance of genetic 
information in our lives”); Soren Holm, There is Nothing Special About Genetic Information, in 
GENETIC INFORMATION: ACQUISITION, ACCESS AND CONTROL 97, 102 (Alison K. Thomson & 
Ruth Chadwick eds., 1999) (arguing that there is no distinction between genetic information and 
other types of health-related data); Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Genetics Privacy and 
the Law: An End to Genetics Exceptionalism, 40 JURIMETRICS 21 (1999) (asserting that genetic 
exceptionalism impairs the achievement of public health goals because genetic information is no 
different from other health data); Lainie F. Ross, Genetic Exceptionalism vs. Paradigm Shift: 
Lessons from HIV, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 141, 141 (2001) (advocating that health care policy 
should not give rise to a principle of genetic exceptionalism); Jon Beckwith & Joseph S. Alper, 
Reconsidering Genetic Antidiscrimination Legislation, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 205 (1998) (urging 
the legislature to redraft antidiscrimination laws for genetic medical information in the same 
manner as those for non-genetic medical information). 
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If our field of medical genetics realizes the bright future, often 
predicted for it, genetic and genomic information will 
increasingly aid medical decision-making in many clinical arenas. 
This promise calls into question—in our view appropriately—a 
core assumption of our field: that genetic information is 
qualitatively different from other types of medical information 
and thus must be treated in a different way.416 
Accompanying this sort of view has been an increasingly powerful chorus 
of arguments refuting the basic claims of genetic exceptionalists. While 
genetic information can often predict distant future health (sometimes with 
high accuracy) there are many examples of non-genetic health information 
possessing comparable predictive power.417 For example, a test revealing 
high blood pressure can predict one’s chance of developing heart 
disease.418 Similarly, non-genetic health information can also have a 
profound impact on family members, and can cause psychosocial or 
economic harm.419 
This strong refutation of genetic exceptionalism is relevant in the 
RNTK debate. Proponents of the RNTK are effectively arguing that the 
return of any genetic information requires explicitly soliciting patient 
consent. Since it is standard practice in many clinical situations to disclose 
certain kinds of non-genomic medical findings without asking for explicit 
permission, it seems fair to ask whether this instance of genetic 
exceptionalism is warranted. 
Autonomy is obviously an important value in medical ethics; modern 
social norms have clearly and enthusiastically moved away from medicine’s 
paternalistic history. However, it isn’t true that patients are asked to make 
decisions about every single aspect of their health care. If a patient 
undergoes a specifically indicated scan (e.g., to check on the healing of a 
broken bone), but that scan incidentally reveals a potentially cancerous 
tumor, a doctor isn’t going to ask the patient if they want to learn about the 
unexpected but important result. Similarly, if a patient receives a routine 
blood panel to check for a specific indication (e.g., monitoring 
hypertension) but the panel returns a panic value indicating a serious acute 
 
 416. Evans & Burke, supra note 410, at 501. 
 417. See, e.g., Green & Botkin, supra note 408, at 572; Ross, supra note 415, at 143. 
 418. Green & Botkin, supra note 408, at 572. 
 419. See, e.g., id. at 572–73. See also GENETIC TESTING COMM. TO THE MEDICAL SECTION OF 
THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF GENETIC TESTING IN 
RISK CLASSIFICATION 45, 45–46 (1989) (arguing that insurance underwriters routinely rely on 
information such as HIV status, serum cholesterol levels, alcohol or narcotic addiction, and even 
blood pressure to determine eligibility and rates for life or disability insurance); Angelo A. Alonzo 
& Nancy R. Reynolds, Stigma, HIV and AIDS: An Exploration and Elaboration of a Stigma 
Trajectory, 41 SOC. SCI. MED. 303, 312 (1995) (demonstrating that patients with AIDS and 
leprosy have been stigmatized). 
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problem (e.g., impending renal failure) the physician isn’t going to ask 
before disclosing this urgent finding. 
These analogies aren’t perfect;420 genomic findings generally aren’t 
associated with conditions that require immediate attention, nor is genetic 
predisposition always equivalent to a diagnosis of manifested disease.421 
But the question isn’t whether genetic information is precisely analogous to 
the urgent cases presented above. Rather, the relevant question should be 
whether and why the kind of important genomic information being 
discussed here warrants special treatment. Given the thorough rejection of 
genetic exceptionalism, the burden of proof lies with RNTK proponents to 
make that case. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The currently prevailing view about the RNTK involves an almost 
exclusive focus on the principle of autonomy. This pure autonomy view 
results in an environment where individual preferences must be actively 
sought and respected. At the other end of the spectrum, one can imagine an 
argument that completely relies on beneficence, justifying forced provision 
of genetic information whenever it could provide medical benefit to a given 
individual. In between, there seems to be a more centrist, qualified 
disclosure view. Embracing “libertarian paternalism,”422 we could give 
patients a choice not to receive genetic information (even if that decision 
seems objectively unreasonable) but could also create a default package of 
recommended variants to disclose. This would function as a form of soft 
paternalism, helping to frame decision-making in a way that is thought to 
lead to more beneficial choices. 
I reject the pure autonomy view for the reasons explored throughout 
this article. First, the philosophical basis for such a position seems shaky—
susceptible to a range of at least plausible, if not convincing, challenges.423 
Second, a legal analysis cannot support the claim that psychological 
integrity clearly deserves the same kind of protection afforded to bodily 
integrity.424 Third, there is reason to think people’s instincts about the 
RNTK will shift away from a pure autonomy view as genomic medicine 
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becomes increasingly incorporated into everyday medical care.425 Fourth, 
there is a strong argument to make that a pure autonomy view could do 
more harm than good.426 Finally, if we widen the debate beyond a focus on 
autonomy, there are other considerations, such as moral distress and genetic 
exceptionalism that, while not dispositive on their own, weigh in favor of a 
more limited view of the RNTK.427  
I cannot, however, endorse a pure beneficence view either. It seems 
too paternalistic to force information on someone who is actively resisting 
that knowledge. Libertarian paternalism is attractive, but partially fails 
because of concerns about our ability to accurately assess individual 
preferences for such a complex question. My view falls somewhere 
between the liberal paternalism and pure beneficence views. For high 
impact genetic information, I think that it is a mistake to actively solicit 
preferences. We should inform patients that there is a default set of high 
impact incidental findings that will be sought and returned. In the rare case 
that someone independently requests to not learn about this information, in-
depth counseling should be provided to ensure that they fully understand 
the choice being made, but ultimately the decision should be honored if not 
knowing consistently remains their clearly stated preference. For high 
impact genetic information, any deviation from regular disclosure should be 
a clearly defined exception, rather than the basis for a broadly applied 
conception of the RNTK. 
This approach should be relatively uncontroversial for the vast 
majority of people since most autonomous adults would want to know life-
saving information. There are, however, a few predictable exceptions that 
should be anticipated and accommodated, namely, terminally ill patients, 
elderly individuals, and people with religious objections to treatment. These 
are all cases where clinical action would likely not be indicated, so it might 
be appropriate for medical providers to actively solicit preferences. These 
kinds of cases represent an important exception to my proposed approach, 
but I do not believe that we should institute a strong RNTK policy based on 
a small group that is relatively easy to bracket. The RNTK has become an 
ingrained part of our lexicon, and though I ultimately believe that we should 
abandon the term altogether, I recognize that this is unlikely. At the very 
least, a compelling case can be made that we should at least stop talking 
about the RNTK in such strong terms.  
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